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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
GERALD STEVEN WALLACE, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 20051115-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(5) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) (West 2004) prohibit a trial court 
from imposing more than thirty-six months probation for any felony offense? 
2. May a court impose consecutive terms of probation for multiple felony 
convictions? 
Standard of Review. On certiorari review, this Court must determine whether 
the court of appeals accurately reviewed the trial court decision under the 
appropriate standard of review. See State v. On, 2005 UT 92, f 7,127 P.3d 1213. 
Defendant did not object to his sentence in the trial court (R. 415:10-14). 
Consequently, the court of appeals reviewed his sentence for illegality under rule 
22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434,117, 
124 P.3d 259. Accordingly, this Court must determine whether the court of appeals 
correctly determined that defendant's sentence was not illegal. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are attached as Addendum D: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 8,2004, a jury convicted defendant of one count of racketeering, 
three counts of securities fraud, one count of selling an unregistered security, and 
one court of selling a security without a license (R. 363-64; 414:456-57). The 
convictions arose from defendant's participation in a Ponzi scheme that defrauded 
several homeowners out of approximately $625,000 of equity in their homes (R. 
412:86,88-89,159,203).i 
At the sentencing hearing, on September 27,2004, the trial court made clear 
that it was not going to send defendant to jail (R. 415:4). Rather, it wanted to ensure 
1
 A Ponzi scheme is an investment program that uses money from later 
investors to pay earnings to earlier investors (R. 413:373). 
2 
that he paid full restitution and that the restitution plan would not "put [defendant] 
in a position to fail" (R. 415:4, 8). Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to 
consecutive prison terms for each conviction, but suspended the prison terms and 
placed defendant on probation (R. 382-83; 415:10-11). The court then said, "I don't 
want you on probation for 36 months. Probation is going to be a lot longer than 
that" (R. 415:11). The court explained, "I want it longer intentionally so that we're 
giving you as long an opportunity as possible to make restitution payments" (R. 
415:11). 
The court then asked, "How far can I set it with six consecutive felonies?" (R. 
415:11). An unidentified person said, "Well, I think you can run it 36 months -" (R. 
415:11). The judge responded, "Currently on each one?" (R. 415:11). The prosecutor 
then pointed out that a co-defendant was on probation for twelve years (R. 415:11). 
The judge said, "That's what I'm inclined to do in this particular case as well. Place 
you on probation for a period of 144-months, a 12-year period" (R. 415:11). 
Defendant did not object to the length of his probation (R. 415:11-14). See 
Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, % 19. Instead, after accepting probation, he obtained new 
counsel and filed a timely notice of appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 390). In 
that court, he claimed for the first time that his 144-month probation violated Utah 
law. See Br. Aplt. at 21. Specifically, he asserted that Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
l(10)(a)(i) (West 2004) prohibits courts from imposing a probation term of greater 
3 
than thirty-six months.2 That section states, "Probation may be terminated at any 
time at the discretion of the court or upon completion without violation of 36 
months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of 
class B or C misdemeanors or infractions/' Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10)(a)(i). 
Defendant reasoned that section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) required courts to terminate 
felony probation after thirty-six months, and that a court could only, therefore, 
impose a felony probation term of thirty-six months. Br. Aplt. at 44 
The State responded that the use of the word //may,/ in section 77-18-
l(10)(a)(i) made the thirty-six month probation termination date discretionary, not 
mandatory. See Br. Aple. at 43-47. The State further pointed out that defendant had 
not yet completed thirty-six months of probation without violation, so he had not 
yet fulfilled all the conditions to trigger a termination of probation under the statute. 
See Br. Aple. at 47. He thus could not invoke section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) to show that 
his sentence was illegal. The State also argued that even if probation was limited to 
thirty-six month terms, the district court intended to impose six consecutive 
probation terms of twenty-four months each. See Br. Aple. at 48-49. 
2
 Defendant also claimed the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence that 
his violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act were willful. See Br. Aplt. at 21. 
The court of appeals held, however, that the evidence of defendant's willfulness was 
sufficient. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, % 16. 
4 
In a published opinion, the court of appeals held that defendant's sentence 
was not illegal. See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, f 17. It explained that section 77-18-
l(l)(a)(i) "simply states that a court 'may' terminate probation upon completion of 
thirty-six months probation, so long as no violation has occurred within that time." 
Id. at 118. It held that a district court has discretion to terminate probation within 
that time frame, but is not limited to imposing only probation of thirty-six months. 
Id. Because it held that section 77-18-1 (10) (a)(i) did not prohibit probation terms of 
longer than thirty-six months, the court of appeals did not reach the question of 
whether a trial court may impose consecutive probation terms for separate offenses. 
Id. at 119 n.ll . 
Defendant petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the opinion 
of the court of appeals. This Court granted the petition as to the following two 
questions: "1 . Whether Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10)(a)(i) creates a thirty-six month 
limitation for a term of probation as to any felony conviction. 2. Whether 
consecutive terms of probation for multiple convictions may be imposed." See 
Order, dated February 21,2006. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant asserts that the 144-month probation term he accepted at 
sentencing violates Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i). Defendant is incorrect. As 
5 
the court of appeals correctly held, the statute does not restrict a trial court's 
authority to impose probation for a term longer than thirty-six months. It only 
authorizes a trial court to release an offender from probation if he completes a 
thirty-six month term without violation. 
POINT II 
Defendant asserts that trial courts may not impose consecutive terms of 
probation for multiple offenses. He reasons that section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) puts an 
absolute cap of thirty-six months on probation time, regardless of the number of 
offenses involved. He also argues that probation is not a "sentence" within the 
purview of the consecutive sentencing statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 
2004), but rather, is merely the result of a suspended sentence. 
As explained in Point I, section 77-18-1 does not cap a probation term at 
thirty-six months. But even if it did, the cap would not bar consecutive terms of 
probation for multiple convictions. Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2), a sentence 
includes probation. In that same chapter, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 permits courts 
to order multiple sentences to run consecutively. Thus, a trial court may order a 




I. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1 (10)(a)(i) DOES NOT PROHIBIT A 
TRIAL COURT FROM IMPOSING A PROBATION TERM 
LONGER THAN THIRTY-SIX MONTHS 
Defendant claims that a trial court may not impose a term of probation longer 
than thirty-six months. Br. Pet. at 7-17. Specifically, he claims that the plain 
language and the legislative history of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) (West 
2004) demonstrate the legislature's intent to limit a felony probation to a thirty-six 
month period, regardless of the severity of the crime, the offender's rehabilitative 
needs, or the number of offenses. Br. Pet. at 7. 
Defendant did not object to his sentences and accepted the probation terms 
(R. 415:10-14). Consequently, the court of appeals reviewed the sentences under 
rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which permits courts to correct an 
illegal sentence at any time. See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, % 17. A sentence is 
illegal if it is "beyond the authorized statutory range/7 See State v. Telford, 2002 UT 
51, f 5 n. l , 48 P.3d 228. Thus, this Court must determine if Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
l(10)(a)(i) imposes a thirty-six-month statutory limitation on the length of probation 
for six felony convictions. 
7 
A. A trial court's authority to grant and terminate probation is 
statutory. 
A trial court's authority "to grant, modify, or revoke probation is purely 
statutory, and although a trial court has discretion in these matters, the court's 
discretion must be exercised within the limits imposed by the legislature." Smith v. 
Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah 1990). See also State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462,463 (Utah 
1988). The trial court's authority to sentence a defendant to probation is found in 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201 (2)(c) (West 2004). That section states, "Within the limits 
prescribed by [chapter three], a court may sentence a person convicted of an offense 
to any one of the following sentences or combination of them:. . . (c) to probation, 
unless otherwise specifically provided by law." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2). That 
section does not, however, set a minimum or a maximum term of probation, nor 
does it describe how to modify, extend, terminate, or revoke probation. See Wallace, 
2005 UTApp 434,118. 
Instead, the procedures and mechanics of granting and terminating probation 
are found in chapter eighteen of the criminal procedure code, specifically Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1 (West 2004). That section describes how a court grants probation, 
who may supervise probation, when probation may be terminated, and how to 
extend, modify, or revoke probation. Defendant claims that subsection 77-18-
l(10)(a)(i) also limits the length of probation a court may impose for a felony to 
8 
thirty-six months. Br. Pet. at 10. This claim presents a question of statutory 
interpretation. 
B. By its plain language Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) does not 
limit the length of probation a trial court may impose. 
In construing a statute, this Court must attempt to "ascertain and effectuate 
the Legislature's intent." State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995) (citation 
omitted). The Legislature's intent and purpose is most often evident from the plain 
language of the statute. Id. If possible, the statutory language should be given a 
literal meaning. State v. Ewell, 883 P.2d 1360,1363 (Utah App. 1993). Where the 
plain language of the statute is clear, there is no need to look further. See Visitor Info. 
Ctr. Auth. v. Customer Sew. Div., 930 P.2d 1196,1198 (Utah 1997) ("Unless the statute 
on its face is unclear or ambiguous, we find no need to delve into the uncertain facts 
of legislative history."); Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 
P.2d 1017,1020 (Utah 1995) ("When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be 
held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction." (quotations 
and citations omitted)). 
A court may not add or subtract statutory terms. See Reinkraut v. Shalala, 854 
F.Supp. 838, 841 (D. Utah 1994). "Under the plain meaning rule, we seek the 
meaning of the statute from its very language, and if it is straightforward, we 
simply enforce it according to its terms. Its words then bear 'their ordinary 
9 
meaning and the statute is not to be read so as to add or subtract from [that] which 
is stated '" Gardener v. Chrysler Corp., 89 F.3d 729, 736 (10th Cir. 1996) (citation 
omitted). 
The plain meaning of section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) is that a trial court may 
terminate a felony offender's probation after thirty-six months without violation. It 
states, "Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or 
upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or 
infractions/7 Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) (emphasis added); see also Wallace, 
2005UTApp434,<][18. 
By its plain language, section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) is permissive, not restrictive. 
See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, \ 18. The primary legal sense of the word "may" is: 
"Is permitted to." Black's Law Dictionary 443 (2d. Pocket Ed. 2001). Utah courts 
have consistently construed the word "may" as permissive or discretionary. See 
Holmes Dev. LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, \ 25, 48 P.3d 895 ("The plain, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning of the word 'may' is 'permissive' or 'discretionary,' generally 
indicating that an individual is either 'permitted' or '[h]as a possibility' to do 
something.") (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 993 (7th ed. 1999)); Evans v. Bd. Of 
County Comm'rs, 2004 UT App 256, \ 20, 97 P.3d 697 (citing cases in which Utah 
courts have construed "may" as permissive). "[T]he word 'may' imports 
10 
permission, privilege, liberty to do, lack of restraint, a grant of opportunity or 
power. It is never properly used in a denial, a restriction, or a limitation, except in 
connection with the word 'not.'" State v. Mclntyre, 66 P.2d 879,881 (Utah 1937). 
Understood in its permissive context, section 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) grants trial 
courts authority to terminate a felony offender's probation if he completes thirty-six 
months without a violation. It does not, however, prohibit a trial court from setting 
a longer term of probation in anticipation of an offender needing more than thirty-
six months to complete probation. See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434,118. Thus a court 
may give a prooationer such as defendant, who has a large amount of restitution to 
pay, a longer period of probation within which to pay restitution. And if defendant 
pays his restitution and completes thirty-six months without a violation, the court 
may terminate his probation early. Similarly, offenders who require drug, alcohol, 
or sex offender therapy may be given lengthier terms in anticipation of requiring 
more than thirty-six months to complete treatment. 
Defendant nevertheless argues that the disjunctive connector "or" converts 
the thirty-six month period from a discretionary date to a mandatory period. Br. 
Pet. at 8-10. Essentially, he asserts that the word "or" before the clause "upon 
completion without violation" usurps the permissive meaning of the word "may" in 
the preceding clause "[probation may be terminated" and makes the second half of 
section 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) mandatory rather than permissive. But "or" is merely a 
11 
conjunction that makes two events alternatives. Those alternatives are still subject 
to the clause that precedes them. In other words, section 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) gives trial 
courts discretion to terminate probation in one of two scenarios: (1) when the 
offender completes thirty-six months without violation, or (2) any other time before 
the end of the probation period. See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, <f 18. Neither of 
these alternatives, however, prohibit a trial court from setting the initial term of 
probation at longer than thirty-six months. 
This permissive construction of section 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) is not only apparent 
from the plain language of the statute, it is also consistent with its legislative history. 
C. A permissive construction of the statute is consistent with its 
legislative history. 
Up until 1984, there were no guidelines on when and how a trial court could 
terminate an offender's probation.3 Earlier versions of Utah Code of Criminal 
Procedure merely said that the court could "suspend the imposition or execution of 
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period of time as it 
determines/7 1980 Utah Laws 141, c. 15, § 2, 77-18-1(1); see also Smith v. Cook, 803 
P.2d 788,791-92 (Utah 1990) (explaining that before 1984 amendment, section 77-18-
3
 Consistent with the code of criminal procedure, this brief uses the term 
"terminate" to describe the successful completion of probation. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(10)(a)(i). The term "revoke" is used to describe stopping probation and 
sending the offender to prison. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12)(a)(ii). 
12 
1 "did not limit length of time a person convicted of a felony could be placed on 
probation"). 
In 1984, the Legislature added subsection (10)(a) to section 77-18-1. See 1984 
Utah Laws 88, c. 20, § 1. That subsection then read, "Upon completion without 
violation of 18 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or six 
months in class B misdemeanor cases, the offender shall be terminated from sentence 
and the supervision of the Division of Corrections, unless the person is earlier 
terminated by the court." Id. (emphasis added). 
At that time, however, the Legislature did not repeal the language found in 
subsection 77-18-1(1) that said a trial court could "place the defendant on probation 
for such period of time it determines." 1980 Utah Laws 141, c. 15, § 2, 77-18-1(1). 
Instead, it modified that language slightly, allowing the court to "place the 
defendant on probation for a period of time it may determine, unless otherwise 
provided by law." 1984 Utah Laws 88, c. 20 § 1. Thus in 1984, a trial court could 
impose any length of probation it determined at sentencing, but was required to 
terminate probation in felony cases after eighteen months without a violation. In 
other words, subsection (10) (a) regulated under what conditions a trial court was 
mandated to terminate probation, but not how long the court could initially set it 
for. 
13 
Three years later, in 1987, the Legislature again amended section 77-18-1. See 
1987 Utah Laws 658, c. 114, § 1. It removed the language in subsection 77-18-1(1) 
that allowed the court to set probation "for a period of time it may determine, unless 
otherwise provided by law/ ' Id. It did not, however, define a maximum probation 
period. Rather, it left in place the requirement that "probation shall be terminated" 
when the offender completed eighteen months without violation. Id. (emphasis 
added). It also renumbered the relevant subsection, 77-18-1 (10)(a), as 77-18-1 (7)(a). 
Id. 
The senate sponsor of the 1987 amendments explained during the senate floor 
debates that the amendments were needed to "improve the syntax, consolidate or 
repeal repetitious or superfluous language, and to clarify ambiguities." Floor 
Debate on H.B. 167,47th Utah Legis., Gen. Sess. (February 25,1987). He also stated 
that the amendments "would give the court the flexibility to continue probation 
until the probationer completes eighteen months of probation without a violation." 
Id. 
A year later, this Court interpreted the "shall be terminated" language from 
the 1984 amendment as automatically terminating felony probation after eighteen 
months. See State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462,464-65 (Utah 1988). The Court held that the 
word "shall" was a "strong mandate" and that unless revocation proceedings were 
commenced prior to the end of the initial eighteen month period, probation would 
14 
terminate and the trial court could not thereafter extend or revoke probation. Id.; see 
also Smith, 803 P.2d at 792 (construing the 1984 amendments as "limiting the time a 
person convicted of a felony can be placed on probation to eighteen months'7). 
In its first session after the Green decision, the legislature amended section 77-
18-1 (7) (a) to its present form. It replaced the phrase "the probation period shall be 
terminated" with the phrase "[probation may be terminated." See 1989 Utah Laws 
690, c. 226 § 1, 77-18-1 (7)(a). It also increased the time period of a no-violation 
termination from eighteen months to thirty-six months. Id. 
The shift from "shall" to "may" following the Green decision is significant. See 
Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, <f 18, n.8. The word "shall" "is 'usually presumed 
mandatory and has been interpreted as such previously in this and other 
jurisdictions.'" Pugh v. Draper City, 2005 UT 12,113,114 P.3d 546 (quoting Bd. of 
Educ. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030,1033 (Utah 1983)). The word "may" on the 
other hand, "imports permission, privilege, liberty to do, lack of restraint, a grant of 
opportunity or power." Mclntyre, 66 P.2d at 881; see also discussion supra pt. LB. 
The Green court had interpreted the "shall be terminated" language as 
essentially placing an eighteen-month limit on probation, absent a violation. See 
Smith, 803 P.2d at 791-92. By replacing "shall" with "may," the legislature signaled 
its intent to overrule Green and make termination after thirty-six violation-free 
months a permissive act of the court rather than a strong mandate that 
15 
automatically terminated probation. See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, <f 18 n.8. The 
effect was essentially to return the statute to its pre-1984 construction: Courts may 
set probation for any length of time that is necessary, and when the offender 
completes thirty-six months without violation, the court may terminate supervised 
probation. See discussion supra pt. LB. 
Defendant nevertheless claims that the legislative history demonstrates that a 
trial court may not set probation for longer than thirty-six months, regardless of the 
severity or number of offenses or the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Br. Pet. 
at 11-13. Defendant points to the floor debates of the 1989 amendment for support. 
Br. Pet. at 13. During the third reading of the amendment in the House of 
Representatives, the sponsor of the amendment explained: 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. House Bill 314 is intended to correct a major 
problem in the AP&P area. Both the courts and the department of 
corrections have had difficulty in managing the probationers within 
the statutory limits that we currently have. The time limits on 
probations have been difficult to collect the fines and restitutions 
owing or to complete other programs within the probation period. And 
this bill, number one, extends the probationary period for, number one, 
misdemeanants, from six to twelve months, and for felons from 
eighteen to thirty-six months. Number two, it codifies the present 
practice of the court putting convicted person on probation with an 
agency of local government or a private organization, and lastly, it 
allows the court to retain jurisdiction to collect the outstanding fines 
and restitutions after the probationary period has ended. 
The bill is endorsed by the judicial counsel, the department of 
corrections, and by the state association of prosecuting attorneys. Mr. 
Speaker, I think that ends my presentation. 
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Floor Debate on H.B. 314, 48th Utah Legis., Gen. Sess. (February 16, 1989). No 
questions were asked, and no further discussion was held. 
Defendant claims that "had the legislature intended to eliminate statutory 
limitations on probation, it would have eliminated the limitations instead of 
redefining them." Br. Pet. At 13. But the Legislature did eliminate the mandatory 
limits, and the sponsor's comments are entirely consistent with an intent to 
eliminate the limits. According to the sponsor, Adult Probation and Parole was 
having difficulty "managing the probationers within the statutory limits that [Utah] 
currently [had]." Floor Debate on H.B. 314,48th Utah Legis., Gen. Sess. (February 
16,1989). "The time limits on probations [made it] difficult to collect the fines and 
restitution owing or to complete other programs within the probation period." Id. 
The 1989 amendment eliminated those limits by removing the "strong mandate" of 
the word "shall," Green, 757 P.2d at 464, and replacing it with the permissive word 
"may," Mclntyre, 66 P.2d at 881. Accordingly, the courts now have discretion to 
terminate probation at thirty-six months, but if there remains fines, restitution, or 
uncompleted programs such as drug or sex offender treatment, then the court need 
not terminate probation even if thirty-six months have passed without violation.4 
4
 The court cannot, of course, continue probation beyond the original term set 
at sentencing without complying with the procedures in section 77-18-1(12) to 
modify or extend probation. 
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D. Cases construing section 77-18-1 since the 1989 amendment have 
not directly addressed the question before this Court and thus are 
of little precedential value. 
Since the 1989 amendment, two cases from the court of appeals and one case 
from this Court have referred to the time periods in section 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) as 
"maximum formal probation periods/7 State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah 
App. 1993); see also State v. Call, 1999 UT 4 2 , 1 1 1 , 980 P.2d 201; State v. McDonald, 
2005 UT App 86, % 19,110 P.3d 149, cert, denied, 124 P.3d 251 (Utah 2005). None of 
those cases, however, directly addressed the question of whether section 77-18-
l(10)(a)(i) imposes a maximum period of probation. See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, ^ 
18 n.10. 
Call considered the question of what the State must do to notify the offender 
of a probation violation in order to extend probation before it terminates. See Call, 
1999 UT 42, 1 8. McDonald confronted the question of whether a trial court's 
sentence of two years formal probation followed by twelve and one-half years of 
informal probation for convictions for fifty-eight class C misdemeanors, could be 
construed as fifty-eight ninety-day periods of probation. See McDonald, 2005 UT 
App 86, Yi 17-18. Robinson questioned whether a trial court could retain 
jurisdiction over a probationer until he pays his restitution. See Robinson, 860 P.2d at 
983. In all three cases, the courts assumed without analysis that the probation terms 
in section 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) were maximum limits. As the question before this Court 
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was not directly addressed in those cases, they are of little precedential value in 
resolving the instant case.5 See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, % 18 n.10 
E. Alternatively, even if section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) requires termination 
of felony probation after thirty-six months without a violation, it 
does not render defendant's sentences illegal. 
Alternatively, even if defendant is correct that the thirty-six month period in 
section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) creates a mandatory termination date, defendant's sentences 
are not illegal. Termination of probation under section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) occurs only 
"upon completion without violation of thirty-six months probation/' By its plain 
terms, the statute is not activated until a felony offender has spent at least thirty-six 
months on probation. If, at that point, he has completed the probation terms 
without violation, the court must, under defendant's interpretation of the statute, 
terminate his probation. 
At sentencing, however, courts may anticipate that an offender will require 
longer than thirty-six months to complete all the terms of probation and set the term 
accordingly. See discussion, supra pts. LB & LC. If the offender does manage to 
complete the terms of probation within the thirty-six month period, the longer term 
5
 Defendant also cites to State v. Denny in support of his claim that section 77-
18-l(10)(a)(i) sets maximum probation periods. Br. Pet. at 16-17. But Denny was 
decided under the pre-1989 amendment version of the statute—the version that 
used the word "shall" rather than "may." See State v. Denny, 776 P.2d 91,92 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
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at sentencing becomes of no effect because the court must, under defendant's 
interpretation of the statute, terminate probation. 
In the instant case, defendant has not yet completed thirty-six months of 
probation without a violation. It is premature for him to invoke section 77-18-
l(10)(a)(i) to limit the term of his probation. Cf. State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372,1379 
(Utah 1996). His sentences are thus legal, and this Court should affirm them. 
II. A TRIAL COURT MAY IMPOSE CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF 
PROBATION 
Alternatively, even if defendant is correct that a trial court can only impose 
probation in thirty-six month increments, defendant's probation term of 144 months 
is not illegal because it represents consecutive probation terms imposed in lieu of six 
consecutive prison sentences. 
At sentencing, the trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms 
for each conviction, but suspended the prison terms and placed defendant on 
probation (R. 415:10-11). The judge then asked, "How far can I set [probation] with 
six consecutive felonies?" (R. 415:11). An unidentified person said, "Well, I think 
you can run it 36 months - " (R. 415:11). The judge responded, "Currently on each 
one?" (R. 415:11). The prosecutor then pointed out that a co-defendant was on 
probation for twelve years (R. 415:11). The judge then said, "That's what I'm 
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inclined to do in this particular case as well. Place you on probation for a period of 
144-months, a 12-year period" (R. 415:11).6 
Defendant claims a court may not impose consecutive terms of probation, 
regardless of the severity or number of the crimes or the rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant. Pet Br. at 17. He argues that section 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) puts an absolute 
cap of thirty-six months on probation and that courts may not impose consecutive 
probation terms. Br. Pet. at 19. He asserts that "no matter how many felonies, 
misdemeanors, or infractions a defendant is convicted of, any subsequent probation 
still is limited by statute/ ' Pet. Br. at 19 Thus, in defendant's view, a person 
convicted of five first degree felonies could be sentenced to five consecutive prison 
terms of five years to life, but a lenient court could not impose more than thirty-six 
months probation if it chose to impose probation. 
6
 Defendant asserts in his conclusion, without analysis or citation to the record 
or any authority, that "the trial court provided no clear indication of its intent to 
impose consecutive terms of probation." Br. Pet. at 27. This Court should refuse to 
consider this claim because it is inadequately briefed. See West Jordan City v. 
Goodman, 2006 UT 27 , f29 (explaining that adequate briefing requires meaningful 
legal analysis, including citation to authority, development of that authority, and 
reasoned analysis based on that authority). Defendant's conclusory assertion fails to 
explained the legal standard for imposing consecutive sentences or how the facts of 
this case fail to meet that standard. Moreover, his claim ignores that the trial court 
clearly imposed consecutive prison terms. 
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Defendant's reliance on section 77-18-1 is misplaced. That section does not 
purport to regulate consecutive and concurrent sentencing. It only instructs courts 
on how to start, modify, extend, and stop probation. See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, 
1118. 
Consecutive sentencing is regulated by an entirely different title in the code: 
Title 76. Section 76-3-201, states that "a court may sentence a person convicted of an 
offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them: (a) to pay a 
f ine. . . (c) to probation. . . [or] (d) to imprisonment." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) 
(West 2004). Under section 76-3-401 (West 2004), a court "shall determine, if a 
defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to 
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offense." Thus when a person is 
guilty of more than one offense, the court may impose concurrent or consecutive 
fines, probations, and prison terms. 
Defendant nevertheless claims that probation is not a "sentence" under 
section 76-3-401 and that a trial court cannot therefore impose consecutive probation 
periods. Br. Pet. at 17. He relies on section 77-18-1 (2)(a), which says that "the court 
may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the 
defendant on probation." Br. Pet. at 20. He explains that under that section, 
probation is not a sentence, but rather, it is what takes the place of a suspended 
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sentence. Br. Pet. at 20. He concludes that terms of probation are not subject to the 
consecutive sentencing statute. Br. Pet. at 21. 
In fact, the plain language of section 77-18-l(2)(a) permits multiple probation 
terms. It allows the court to impose "probation" for "any offense or crime." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (2)(a). It follows that where a defendant is convicted of several 
crimes, the court may impose a term of probation for each crime. It must then 
determine, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 whether the probation terms will run 
concurrently or consecutively. 
Defendant also asserts that allowing courts to impose consecutive terms of 
probation violates the double jeopardy and due process protections of the United 
States and Utah Constitutions. Pet. Br. at 24-26. He argues that those protections 
prohibit multiple punishments for the same offense or punishments that are 
imposed and then later increased. Br. Pet. at 25. He then argues that construing 
probation as a sentence in the consecutive sentencing statute would subject a 
defendant to multiple sentences for a single offense. Br. Pet. at 24-25. That is, a 
defendant who has his prison sentence suspended, is put on probation, and then has 
probation revoked and the prison term reinstated would be subject to multiple 
sentences. Pet. Br. at 24-25. 
Defendant's claim is meritless. Defendant did not commit a single offense, he 
committed six offenses. Moreover, double jeopardy protections are not implicated 
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by revoking probation and imposing the original prison term. See United State v. 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137 (1980). "The Double Jeopardy Clause does not 
provide the defendant with the right to know at any specific moment in time what 
the exact limit of his punishment will turn out to be/ ' Id. These well established 
maxims of constitutional law are not suddenly inapplicable merely because 
probation is called a sentence for consecutive sentencing purposes. 
Nor are defendant's due process rights violated by his probation. Defendant 
chose to accept a twelve-year probation rather than be incarcerated for up to thirty 
years.7 See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, % 19. 
"'Probation' is an act of grace by the court suspending the imposition or 
execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed conditions." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-27-1(10) (West 2004). Probation is essentially a contract between the 
defendant and the court. See Hurd v. State, 107 P.3d 314,333 (Alaska App. 2005). "If 
the defendant does not like the terms prescribed by the court, he does not have to 
accept them. And if he does agree to the terms set forth, he should abide by them." 
State v. Allmendinger, 565 P.2d 1119,1121 (Utah 1977). 
7
 The court of appeals stated that defendant faced potential incarceration of 
up to seventy years. See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, % 19. Though defendant was 
sentenced to six consecutive prison terms, his actually imprisonment would have 
been limited to thirty years. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (6)(a). 
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If defendant did not want 144 months of probation, he could have declined 
the court's offer and been incarcerated, where "he would have 'conceivably and 
realistically been spending the rest of [his] life in prison." Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, 
^ 19 (quoting the sentencing court).8 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Respectfully submitted May 10,2006. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ziA^fi^ 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Respondent 
8
 Defendant is a middle-aged man. Thirty years in prison is effectively the 
rest of his life. 
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DAVIS, Judge: 
Hi Gerald Steven Wallace appeals his conviction for various 
violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act (UUSA). See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 to -30 (2000 & Supp. 2002) . We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
^2 These criminal proceedings arise out of a Ponzi scheme 
called "The Program."1 Defendant learned of The Program from Al 
Anderson and Paul Stewart. Stewart claimed to be able to earn 
commissions by facilitating money transfers from banks with 
surplus cash reserves to banks with insufficient cash reserves. 
To facilitate these transfers, however, Stewart asserted that he 
needed to have a certain amount of money on deposit with the 
bank. 
1. A Ponzi scheme is a "fraudulent investment scheme in which 
money contributed by later investors generates artificially high 
dividends for the original investors, whose example attracts even 
larger investments." Black's Law Dictionary 1180 (7th ed. 1999). 
%3 Between August 2000 and March 2001, Defendant purchased at 
least three homes in the state of Utah. The purchase of each 
home was conditioned upon the seller agreeing to reinvest a 
portion of the proceeds from the sale (in each case at least 
$200,000) in an attorney trust account, which was initially held 
at Attorneyfs Title Guarantee Fund. Stewart claimed that he 
would use the trust account money to facilitate the bank 
transfers and to pay interest to the trust account beneficiaries 
from his commissions.2 In fact, Stewart was embezzling funds 
from the trust account, and each of the three sellers lost their 
principal investment and received very little, if any, interest. 
|^4 The State charged Defendant with selling unregistered 
securities, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-7 (2000), -21 (Supp. 
2002) , and selling securities without a license, see id. §§ 61-1-
3(1)-(2) (2000), -21 (Supp. 2002). In support thereof, the State 
offered evidence at trial that The Program was not registered as 
a security, nor was Defendant licensed to sell securities. 
Defendant, on the other hand, claims innocence because the record 
contains no evidence that he knew he was selling securities. 
f5 The State also charged Defendant with securities fraud. See 
id. §§ 61-1-1(2) (2000), -21 (Supp. 2002). In support thereof, 
the State offered evidence at trial that Defendant failed to 
disclose several facts about The Program and those administering 
it, including that: (1) Defendant declared bankruptcy in 1998, 
(2) Anderson was convicted of a felony in 1986, (3) a lawsuit was 
filed in 2000 against Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund and others 
involved in The Program, (4) Stewart received a cease-and-desist 
order from the Utah Division of Securities in 2 000, and (5) there 
were certain risks involved in The Program. In his defense, 
Defendant argued that he was unaware of the pending legal 
troubles of Stewart and Attorney!s Title Guarantee Fund, and that 
he did not know that his bankruptcy and Anderson's felony 
conviction were relevant. Defendant also testified that, 
contrary to their testimony, he did disclose the risks of The 
Program to the sellers.3 
2. The account would purportedly pay interest to the seller at a 
fixed rate for two years and then return the principal to the 
seller. The account supposedly generated enough interest to pay 
not just the seller's interest, but also to pay the buyer's 
mortgage. 
3. Defendant was also charged with engaging in a pattern of 
unlawful activity (racketeering), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-
1601 to -1609 (1999 & Supp. 2002), which he does not address on 
appeal. 
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f6 Defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts. The trial 
court sentenced Defendant to consecutive prison terms for each 
count, but suspended the prison terms. The trial court placed 
Defendant on probation for 144 months and ordered $626,000 in 
restitution.4 Defendant obtained new counsel and filed a timely 
notice of appeal. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
f7 Although Defendant characterizes his arguments as 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Defendant is 
actually challenging the trial court's definition of willfulness, 
which was taken from a statute and was given to the jury in the 
form of an instruction. "The correct interpretation of a statute 
is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness." State v. 
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). 
H8 Based on the definition of willfulness that Defendant now 
argues is appropriate, Defendant also claims that the State 
failed to introduce sufficient evidence that his violations of 
UUSA were willful, and that his counsel at trial was ineffective 
because he failed to preserve this issue at trial. When 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we will "uphold the 
[jury's] decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all 
inferences that can reasonably be drawn from it, we conclude that 
some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that 
the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt." State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989). 
"Where, as here, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
raised for the first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary 
hearing, it presents a question of law." State v. Bryant, 965 
P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). However, "appellate review 
of counsel's performance must be highly deferential; otherwise 
the distorting effects of hindsight would produce too great a 
temptation for courts to second-guess trial counsel's performance 
on the basis of an inanimate record." Id. (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
1[9 Defendant finally asserts on appeal that his 144-month 
probation violates Utah law. The illegality of a sentence is a 
question of law, which we review for correctness. See State v. 
Montoya. 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
4. As part of probation, the trial court also barred Defendant 
from acting as a fiduciary or participating in any real estate 




I. Sufficiency of Evidence 
HlO Defendant argues that the State presented insufficient 
evidence of his willful intent to commit securities violations. 
In support thereof, Defendant challenges the trial court's 
definition of willfulness. The jury was instructed that 
[a] defendant acts willfully if it was his 
conscious objective or desire to engage in 
the conduct or cause the result--not that it 
was the defendant's conscious desire or 
objective to violate the law, nor that the 
defendant knew that he was committing fraud 
in the sale of the security. 
Although Defendant did not object to this instruction at trial, 
he now argues that the instruction and resultant convictions were 
erroneous.5 We disagree. 
1[ll Before beginning our analysis, it is necessary to briefly 
review the statutes at issue in this case. Defendant was charged 
with one count of selling a security without a license, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-3(1) -(2) (2000) (stating that it is unlawful to 
act as a broker-dealer or an agent of a broker-dealer in Utah 
without a license), one count of selling an unregistered 
security, see id. § 61-1-7 (2000) (stating that it is unlawful to 
offer or sell a security in Utah unless it is registered), and 
three counts of securities fraud, see id. § 61-1-1(2) (2000) 
(stating that it is unlawful for any person, in connection with 
the offer or sale of any security, to "make any untrue statement 
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact"). 
However, violations of these statutes are not criminal unless 
they are done "willfully." Id. § 61-1-21(1), (2) (Supp. 2002). 
While the UUSA does not define "willfully," Utah's Criminal Code 
states that a person engages in conduct willfully "when it is his 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause 
the result." IcL. § 76-2-103(1) (1999). 
5. Under rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
"[ulnless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to 
give an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as error 
except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). 
The term "manifest injustice" is synonymous with the "plain 
error" standard, wherein an appellant must show that an error 
occurred, the error should have been obvious to the trial court, 
and the error was harmful. See State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55,^40-
41, 82 P.3d 1106. Here, no error occurred. 
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fl2 Defendant claims that the State failed to introduce evidence 
that his sale of securities without a license and that his sale 
of unregistered securities were willful, arguing that "[t]he 
record contains absolutely no evidence that [Defendant] believed 
he was selling securities." However, ignorance of the law is not 
a defense to a crime. See id. § 76-2-304 (1999). Furthermore, 
while no Utah case has directly addressed this issue, the 
majority of jurisdictions have rejected arguments that a 
defendant can avoid criminal liability for selling securities 
without a license and selling unregistered securities by claiming 
ignorance. See, e.cr. , Bayhi v. State, 629 So. 2d 782, 789 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1993) ("A specific criminal intent or guilty knowledge 
that the law is being violated is not required to find criminal 
violations of those sections of the Alabama Securities Act 
prohibiting the sale of unregistered securities and requiring 
registration as a securities dealer . . . ." (internal citations 
omitted)); People v. Terranova, 563 P.2d 363, 367 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1976) (holding that scienter need not be shown with regard to the 
sale of securities without a license and sale of unregistered 
securities); State v. Andresen, 773 A.2d 328, 346 (Conn. 2001) 
(citing twelve jurisdictions, the court stated "[w]e hold, as 
have the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, that the offense 
of wilfully selling unregistered securities requires proof only 
that the defendant intended to do the act prohibited by the 
statute"); State v. Montgomery, 17 P.3d 292, 295 (Idaho 2001) 
("[W]e join the majority of courts that have found scienter is 
not required for violations of the securities registration and 
licensing requirements."); Clarkson v. State, 486 N.E.2d 501, 507 
(Ind. 1985) (affirming convictions for selling unregistered 
securities and selling securities without being a registered 
agent, the court stated "whether [defendant] was aware of the 
Indiana securities laws is of no moment"); State v. Dumke, 901 
S.W.2d 100, 103 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) ("To sustain a conviction 
under the statute [governing registration of securities and 
security agents], it is not necessary to find that the accused 
realized his conduct was in violation of registration 
requirements."); State v. Irons, 574 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Neb. 1998) 
("Knowledge by a defendant that the item sold is a security is 
not required in order to convict under the registration 
provisions of the Uniform Securities Act."); State v. Sheets, 610 
P.2d 760, 770 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (rejecting defendant's 
contention that, in order to commit the crime of selling 
unregistered securities, one must have knowledge that the item 
being sold is a security); State v. Goetz, 312 N.W.2d 1, 12-13 
(N.D. 1981) (finding persuasive federal and state cases that hold 
actual knowledge that a security is being sold in violation of 
the law is not an element of a willful violation of securities 
laws). Quite simply, knowledge by Defendant that the items sold 
were securities was not required to convict him of willfully 
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violating Utah Code section 61-1-3(1) and (2) and Utah Code 
section 61-1-7. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-3 (1)- (2), -7. 
f^l3 Defendant also challenges his securities fraud conviction, 
see id. §§ 61-1-1(2), -21, arguing that the evidence of 
willfulness was insufficient because he acted in "good faith" and 
had an "honest" belief that The Program was legitimate. However, 
Utah courts have refused to read scienter into section 61-1-1(2), 
see State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1360 (Utah 1993), but have 
instead held that willfulness "does not require an intent to 
violate the law or to injure another or acquire any advantage," 
id. at 1358 n.3. "The legislature has indicated that a person 
acts willfully when it is his or her 'desire to engage in the 
conduct that cause[s] the result.'" Id. at 1358 (quoting Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-103) (alteration in original). Therefore, " [t]o 
act willfully in this context means to act deliberately and 
purposefully, as distinguished from merely accidentally or 
inadvertently." Id. at 13 58 n.3. 
1[l4 Here, Defendant contends that he did not act "deliberately 
and purposefully," id., because he did not know about the pending 
legal troubles of Stewart and Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund and 
because he did not know that his bankruptcy and Anderson's felony 
conviction were material. In effect, Defendant is asking us to 
hold that, to convict him of willfully committing securities 
fraud, the State was required to prove that he knew of the 
information that he failed to disclose (even though he did not 
investigate the legitimacy of The Program) and that he knew that 
such information was material. 
|^15 We need not reach these issues.6 Regardless of Defendant's 
knowledge regarding the other issues, Defendant concedes that he 
knew of the risks of The Program, and he does not argue that he 
believed that such information was not material. Instead, 
Defendant simply argues that, "contrary to the sellers' 
testimonies, he disclosed the risks to investors." Here, the 
jury may simply have believed the sellers' testimony over 
Defendant's. See Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 
1987) (stating that a trier of fact "is entitled to give 
conflicting opinions whatever weight he or she deems 
appropriate"). Although the State alleged a number of material 
misrepresentations and omissions, one material misrepresentation 
or omission alone (like Defendant's failure to disclose the risks 
of The Program to each of the three sellers) may be the basis for 
a securities fraud conviction. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) 
6. Although we do not reach the questions posited by Defendant, 
we encourage the legislature to address these issues. 
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(making it unlawful to "make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact" (emphases added)). 
tl6 We will reverse a juryfs guilty verdict only if "the 
evidence and its inferences are so inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which 
he was convicted." State v. Moore, 8 02 P.2d 73 2, 73 8 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (quotations and citation omitted). Thus, "so long as 
some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's 
findings, we will not disturb them." Id. Here, the State 
specifically offered evidence that The Program was not registered 
as a security and that Defendant was not licensed to sell 
securities. The State also elicited testimony from each of the 
sellers that Defendant failed to disclose the risks of The 
Program. Clearly, "some evidence and reasonable inferences 
support the jury!s findings," id., and we therefore affirm the 
convictions. Because we have determined that the State 
introduced sufficient evidence that Defendant's violations of 
UUSA were willful, the failure by Defendant's trial counsel to 
preserve this issue does not constitute ineffective assistance. 
See State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96,1(34, 989 P.2d 52 ("[T]he failure 
of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if 
raised does not constitute ineffective assistance." (alteration 
in original) (quotations and citation omitted)). 
II. Probation 
[^17 Defendant claims that the trial court imposed an illegal 
sentence when it suspended his prison term and placed him on 
probation for 144 months, arguing that Utah Code section 77-18-
1(10)(a)(i) limits probation to thirty-six months. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) (2003).7 We disagree. 
fl8 When construing the language of a statutory provision, we 
"presume that the legislature used each word advisedly" and "will 
not infer substantive terms into the text that are not already 
there." Associated Gen. Contractors v. Board of Oil, Gas & 
Mining, 2001 UT 112, ^ [30, 38 P.3d 291 (quotations and citations 
omitted). The trial court's authority to suspend a sentence and 
impose probation is found in Utah Code section 77-18-1(2), which 
states that on "conviction of any crime or offense, the court 
may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the 
sentence and place the defendant on probation." Utah Code Ann. 
7. Under Utah Code section 77-18-1(10) (a) (i), "[p]robation may 
be terminated . . . upon completion without violation of [thirty-
six] months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) (2003) . 
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§ 77-18-1(2) (a) . Nothing in that section limits the court's 
right to impose probation to a maximum of only thirty-six months. 
And section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) simply states that a court "may" 
terminate probation upon completion of thirty-six months 
probation, so long as no violation has occurred within that time. 
See id. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i). Utah courts have long interpreted 
the word "may" as permissive, not restrictive. See, e.g., Holmes 
Dev. , LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,1(25, 48 P. 3d 895 (interpreting an 
insurance policy stating that the insurance company "may take any 
appropriate action," the court concluded that the parties used 
the word "may" "to set forth their intention that [the insurance 
company] has the option to take appropriate action, but is not 
required to do so"); State v. Mclntyre, 92 Utah 177, 66 P.2d 879, 
881 (1937) ("[T]he word 'may' imports permission, privilege, 
liberty to do, lack of restraint, a grant of opportunity or 
power. It is never properly used in a denial, a restriction, or 
a limitation . . . . " ) . Therefore, the trial court here 
certainly has discretion to terminate Defendant's probation after 
thirty-six months (so long as no violations have occurred within 
that time),9 but is not required to limit probation to that time 
frame.10 
8. The legislature has also expressed its intent that Utah Code 
section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) be read as permissive rather than 
restrictive. In State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988), the 
Utah Supreme Court interpreted the predecessor to section 77-18-
1(10)(a)(i), which stated "'[u]pon completion without violation 
of [eighteen] months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor 
cases, . . . the offender shall be terminated from sentence.1" 
Id. at 464 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a) (Supp. 
1984)). The court determined that the term "shall" was a strong 
legislative mandate that required probation to terminate after 
eighteen months. See id. In 1989, less than one year after 
Green was decided, the Utah legislature amended the statute's 
relevant language to use the term "may" instead of "shall." 
Compare Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7) (a) (Supp. 1988) with id. 
§ 77-18-1(7) (a) (Supp. 1989) (current version at id. § 77-18-
1(10) (a) (i) (2003)) . 
9. As one of the terms of probation, Defendant is required to 
pay restitution in the amount of $626,000 (jointly and severally 
with other defendants involved in The Program) pursuant to a 
payment plan. 
10. We are not bound by cases which, in dicta, assume without 
deciding that Utah Code section 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) creates maximum 
probationary periods. Seer e.g., State v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 
86,^17-21, 110 P.3d 149; State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 982 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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fl9 It should also be noted that Defendant here did not have to 
accept the terms of his probation. See State v. Allmendinger, 
565 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Utah 1977) ("If the defendant does not like 
the terms prescribed by the court, he does not have to accept 
them. And if he does agree to the terms set forth, he should 
abide by them.") Defendant was convicted of four second degree 
felonies (each carrying a one- to fifteen-year sentence) and two 
third degree felonies (each carrying a zero- to five-year 
sentence), creating a potential range of incarceration from four 
to seventy years. In the judgefs own words, had Defendant 
accepted incarceration over probation, he would have "conceivably 
and realistically been spending the rest of [his] life in 
prison." But Defendant did not choose incarceration. He chose 
probation and thereby accepted its terms. Having accepted its 
terms, he now must abide by them. See id.11 
f20 Affirmed. 
f21 WE CONCUR: 
.<j£tK M. B i l l i n g s , (f 
Presiding Judge 
J 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge ^ ^ 
11. Defendant also asserts that the law does not permit a judge 
to impose consecutive terms of probation. Having determined that 
the imposition of 144 months of probation was not in error, we 
need not reach this issue. 
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DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 10, 1960 
Video 
Tape Number: 11:20 
CHARGES 
SECURITIES FRAUD - 2nd Degree 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 
SECURITIES FRAUD - 2nd Degree 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 
SECURITIES FRAUD (amended) - 2 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 
PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY -





nd Degree Felony 
08/12/2004 Guilty 
- 3rd Degree Felony 
08/12/2004 Guilty 
- 3rd Degree Felony 
08/12/2004 Guilty 
2nd Degree Felony 
08/12/2004 Guilty 
Page 1 T>*\ 
Case No: 021910910 
Date: Sep 27, 2004 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SALE OF UNREGISTERED 
SECURITY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNREGISTERED SECURITIES 
AGENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY 
a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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Case No: 021910910 
Date: Sep 27, 2004 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The counts in this case are consecutively. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 144 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole, 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to pay restitution in the amount of $62 6,000 jointly 
and severally. 
Counsel and defendant will form a stipulated plan of payment within 
60 days. If a stipulation cannot be reached, a hearing will be 
set. 
Restitution is to be paid directly to the Attorney General's 
Office. 
The Court appoints LDA for any appeals defendant may make. 
Defendant is not to act as a fiduciary in the State of Utah. 
Defendant is barred from the involvement/execution of any real 
property transactions as either a principal or as a third party 
with the exception of the sale or acquisition of his primary 
residence. 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 27, 2004 
2 JUDGE DENO HIMONAS PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 MR. SIMMS: Can we call the Gerald Wallace matter? 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Wallace. 
6 MS. BARLOW: Charlene Barlow on behalf of the State, 
7 MR. SIMMS: Clayton Simms on behalf of Mr. Wallace. 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Wallace is present. I'll note for 
9 the record, I've received a fairly extensive amount of 
10 correspondence from Mr. Wallace's family and friends. I've 
11 taken the opportunity to review each and every one of those 
12 letters as well as the pre-sentence report. 
13 Counsel, have you all received the pre-sentence 
14 report? 
15 MR. SIMMS: I have, Your Honor. 
16 MS. BARLOW: We did. 
17 THE COURT 
18 MR. SIMMS 
19 THE COURT 
Had a chance to go through it? 
Yes. 
Any corrections that need to be made in 
20 I the pre-sentence report? 
21 MR. SIMMS: Just one correction, Judge, on the second 
22 page, rather than all not guilty verdict, they're all guilty 
23 verdict. Actually it's on the — 
24 THE COURT: I'm not following you, where are you? 


























rather than guilty. 
THE COURT: Do you want to approach Mr. Simms and 
show me what you're - those are the pleas, those aren't the 
verdicts, those are the pleas. 
MR. SIMMS: There's no corrections then. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. SIMMS: No, Your Honor, in terms of corrections. 
MS. BARLOW: I would indicate that on Page 5 the pre-
sentence writer neglected to include Calvin Paul Stewart as— 
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
MS. BARLOW: Calvin Paul Stewart as a (inaudible) he 
went to trial was found guilty and is currently incarcerated. 
THE COURT: Thank you. It seems like we were short. 
MS. BARLOW: We were. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Simms, you may proceed? 
MR. SIMMS: There are no more corrections but I do 
have some comments. I won't go through the facts, the Court 
has heard the trial but I would say that Mr. Wallace has a 
number of letters of support and that's just an indication of 
the type of person that he is. Time and time again they say 
that he's an honorable person. He's been doing well despite 
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1 MR. SIMMS: In addition to that, he's working as an 
2 actor in Savior of the World. You may notice his beard that 
3 he's grown. He's in a Christmas play as well. He's working 
4 again and doing well. 
5 Again, this has been a tragedy for a number of 
6 people, including Mr. Wallace. He lost the equity in his home, 
7 he maxed out credit cards. He and his family lost $480,000. I 
8 think his portion of that was $60,000. He's doing well now. 
9 He's had issues of depression because of this case but he's now 
10 on Wellbutrin and doing well in therapy. 
11 THE COURT: It sounds like, Mr. Wallace, you had 
12 issues of depression that remain in this case? 
13 MR. WALLACE: No sir, I don't. 
14 THE COURT: Am I wrong that there was an issue 
15 involving a child? 
16 MR. SIMMS: I think there was issues of childhood 
17 abuse but I don't know if there's necessary depression. I 
18 think Mr. Wallace was a victim of childhood abuse but has done 
19 well with that and I think he's getting therapy relating to 
20 this fraud and the damage that it's caused his family. 
21 THE COURT: I'm referring to the - not the 
22 allegations, but at about the time that you and your family had 
23 to deal with these legal matters, your oldest daughter died in 
24 a car crash? 
25 MR. WALLACE: That's right. 
1 THE COURT: And that that's the reference that I was 
2 making, causing you some other emotional issues, understandably 
3 causing other emotional issues. 
4 MR. WALLACE: That was after this. 
5 THE COURT: It was afterwards. I'm sorry. 
6 MR. SIMMS: I think if I could get maybe more to the 
7 point, is that the recommendation of 30 days jail is— 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Wallace is not going to jail 
9 (inaudible). 
10 MR. SIMMS: Your Honor, I think that given that, I 
11 think there might be issues in terms of restitution. 
12 THE COURT: Restitution, wefre going to have a long 
13 discussion about. 
14 MR. SIMMS: The difficulty that we have with the 
15 restitution is that he has, in fact, lost everything, he didn't 
16 make an economic gain from this. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Wallace isn't going to jail, Mr. 
18 Wallace is going to pay restitution if he's responsible for 
19 restitution. That's really not optional. 
20 MR. SIMMS: In terms of - maybe we didn't understand. 
21 Is the Court going to order the restitution in this case or is 
22 this Court looking at something wider or... 
23 THE COURT: It will be part of the order in this 
24 case. Part of the condition for probation will be restitution 
25 and I understand given the amount, we're going to have to talk 
1 about it and work it out but there is going to be a restitution 
2 requirement. I want to hear from the State first. 
3 Mr. Barlow, if you want to address the issue of jail 
4 you can but you're going to be whistling in the wind. 
5 MS. BARLOW: I wasn't intending to anyway, Your 
6 Honor, and why waste my breath? I do want to indicate to the 
7 Court a couple of matters that did not come out at trial. One 
8 is is that Mr. Wallace did in 1986 take (inaudible) and also 
9 going back and looking back at the bank records from the Clay 
10 Harrison account and also from the Alvin Anderson account, both 
11 people involved in this, that there was, oh, probably over 
12 $50,000 worth of checks that were made out to Mr. Wallace. I 
13 just wanted to indicate that because as I said— 
14 THE COURT: I think - Mr. Wallace, you were charged 
15 and convicted of these crimes. Restitution is appropriate and 
16 I want to work out some kind of workable order. I'm not going 
17 to order jail. It's just not something that anybody has spent 
18 any time talking to me about but how do we set up, how do we 
19 set up restitution so that Mr. Wallace isn't set up to fail? 
20 MR. SIMMS: Your Honor, given his situation working 
21 at Hollywood Video, having limited means and having seven kids 
22 at home, I think it would be difficult for him to pay anything 
23 more than, say, $50 a month. I know that that would be sort of 
24 a lifetime payment. I think he understands that but I don't 
25 know how he can— 
1 THE COURT: We're talking about nearly $1 million, I 
2 mean, $626,000 and certainly there's going to be joint and 
3 several liability. The co-defendants are going to be 
4 responsible for that as well but $50 a month is not an option. 
5 MR. SIMMS: And I don't know how much he can do. I 
6 don't think that he can work significantly towards the 
7 $626,000. I know that he's worked together with Dan Jackson as 
8 well as other attorneys to get a settlement and to make sure 
9 that these people are taken care of. I think there's been some 
10 work with that and I know that Mr. Van Roo's attorney, Mr. Dan 
11 Jackson is here and I think he would like to speak and maybe he 
12 could comment on where they're at in terms of restitution. 
13 MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, I apologize for my 
14 appearance but I didn't realize that this was on the calendar. 
15 I represent Rich Van Roo and the co-counsel for approximately 
16 60 other victims of this fraud. I've been investigating the 
17 fraud for about two and a half years as Ms. Barlow will testify 
18 to and I think I have the best handle on the case as probably 
19 any one. One of the things that's been important in this case 
20 is that at an early stage Steve Wallace came forward and 
21 assisted us in obtaining material information against the co-
22 defendants and against the companies that employed the co-
23 defendants. In addition, he was instrumental in soliciting the 
24 people that he was involved with to come in and talk to us. As 
25 a result in part of his assistance, we were able to fashion a 
1 case against approximately 42 defendants and filed that in 
2 federal court as a racketeering case. We have accomplished 
3 some initial settlements in that matter that has brought some 
4 restitution to the victims including the people that were 
5 victimized in relationship to Mr. Wallace. 
6 I will note that Clay Harrison has assisted us in a 
7 similar way. None of the other defendants in this matter have 
8 done that and I don't think that we would have the cases that 
9 we had without his assistance. Any questions? 
10 THE COURT; No. 
11 Ms. Barlow? 
12 MS. BARLOW: We all hope that through this federal 
13 lawsuit against especially the parent company of Attorney's 
14 Titlef that money sufficient will come back to pay off all of 
15 these victims. The problem being, of course, all of these 
16 defendants are in the same or similar circumstance as Mr. 
17 Wallace. Some of them are in prison and probably won't be 
18 getting out anytime soon and will not be making any 
19 restitutionary payments. 
20 THE COURT: What is Mr. Harrison's restitution 
21 stipulation? 
22 MS. BARLOW: Well, I'm sorry to laugh but it's 
23 interesting because we had contemplated with Judge Burton that 
24 he would be making some kind of restitutionary, monthly 
25 payment. His attorney said no, that's not what Judge Burton 
1 said and that's not what the agreement was. He was just 
2 suppose to help in the civil lawsuits. So, I certainly can ask 
3 the court to review that. 
4 THE COURT: That remains to be seen I guess is what 
5 you're saying. 
6 MS. BARLOW: Right. 
7 THE COURT: I appreciate your comments. I appreciate 
8 your comments. The reason we're talking about zero jail time 
9 is Mr. Wallace's cooperation. 
10 I mean if there were no cooperation, given, you know, 
11 these counts Mr. Wallace, you'd conceivably be spending the 
12 rest of your life in the Utah State Prison given the number of 
13 convictions that there are but because of your cooperation, I 
14 think that's why we're only looking at 30-day recommendation to 
15 begin with and why I'm not interested in imposing a jail 
16 sentence but, you know, there's still victims out there and 
17 restitution is appropriate, I want to come up with something 
18 that like I said doesn't put you in a position to fail because 
19 that's not my intent but still recognize that you have an 
20 obligation. 
21 MR. JACKSON: May I be excused? 
22 THE COURT: Yes, of course. 
23 Ms. Barlow, give me a recommendation. 
24 MS. BARLOW: Your Honor, as I recall the restitution 
25 I statute - well, you know, we would ask that he be ordered to 
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1 make restitution, complete restitution, that it be joint and 
2 several and, of course, if it's paid through the federal 
3 lawsuit, like I say, everybody would be thrilled with that. I 
4 can't speak for how much he can pay per month. Maybe he starts 
5 out at a lesser amount but as he gets better employment, we 
6 could certainly review these and maybe have— 
7 THE COURT: Here's what I'm going to do. I hear you. 
8 Mr. Wallace, do you want to address the Court before 
9 I impose sentence? 
10 MR. WALLACE: Yes, Your Honor, is that's all right. 
11 THE COURT: It is alright. 
12 MR. WALLACE: I don't know if it's applicable and you 
13 can tell me if it matters or not. This was not something that 
14 I just engaged in light heartedly or flippantly or without any 
15 due diligence on my part. 
16 THE COURT: I was with you through the trial, Mr. 
17 Wallace. 
18 MR. WALLACE: Not everything got presented in the 
19 trial as far as my due diligence and if you say it doesn't 
20 matter, I understand. 
21 THE COURT: It doesn't. You were convicted. I mean, 
22 that's... 
23 MR. WALLACE: Yes, Your Honor, that's fine then. 
24 THE COURT: I understand that in the face of what 
25 we've heard before that you maintained that you had a good 
1 faith basis for doing what you did and I appreciate that. 
2 MR. WALLACE: And I don't-
3 THE COURT: That doesn't lift the fact that you have 
4 restitution obligation. 
5 MR. WALLACE: And the point that I wanted to bring up 
6 was it doesn't mitigate my acknowledgment of the loss and 
7 suffering that others have— 
8 THE COURT: You have behaved as a gentleman 
9 throughout the process. I appreciate that. As I've said 
10 before, but for your cooperation we wouldn't be talking about 
11 no jail sentence. We'd be talking about you would conceivably 
12 and realistically been spending the rest of your life in 
13 prison. That's just not going to happen. But restitution does 
14 need to be made and what I'm inclined to do is with respect to 
15 the events of securities fraud, looking at three separate 
16 charges of securities fraud, counsel, am I right? 
17 MR. SIMMS: Yes. 
18 MS. BARLOW: Yes, three of fraud and then the other 
19 second degree is a pattern of unlawful activity. 
20 THE COURT: All right. With respect to the four 
21 second degree felonies, the three counts of securities fraud 
22 and the pattern of unlawful activity, second degree felonies, I 
23 proposed the 1 to 15 year terms in the Utah State Prison, no 
24 fines. I'm going to have them run consecutively and the same 
25 J with the sale of the unregistered security, unregistered 
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1 securities agent, the third degree felonies, I'm going to 
2 impose the zero to five year terms and have them run 
3 consecutively as well but I'm going to suspend the entirety of 
4 all of the sentences. I'm not imposing a fine. I'd rather see 
5 any money go towards restitution in this case rather than the 
6 payment of any fine. I don't want you on probation for 36 
7 months. Probation is going to be a lot longer than that. I 
8 want it longer intentionally so that we're giving you as long 
9 an opportunity as possible to make restitution payments. How 
10 far can I set it with six consecutive felonies? 
11 MR. ?: Well, I think you can run it 36 months -
12 THE COURT: Currently on each one? 
13 MS. BARLOW: Mr. Harrison is on probation for 12 
14 years. 
15 THE COURT: That's what I'm inclined to do in this 
16 particular case as well. Place you on probation for a period 
17 of 144 months, a 12-year period. I'm going to order 
18 restitution. You're jointly and severally liable for the 
19 $626,000. You're not to act as a fiduciary in the state of 
20 Utah and you're barred from the involvement and execution of 
21 any real property transactions as either principal or third 
22 party with the exception of the seller acquisition of your 
23 primary residence; however, with respect to restitution, what I 
24 want is to give the state, Ms. Barlow, Mr. Simms, Mr. Wallace 
25 J collectively an opportunity to sit down in the next 45 days to 
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1 come up with a reasonable restitution plan recognizing, Ms. 
2 Barlow, that it's highly, highly unlikely - I'm not talking 
3 about one in which he makes complete restitution by himself. 
4 It's just not possible but I want something that's rational, 
5 that doesn't set Mr. Wallace up to fail but at the same time 
6 recognizes the severity of the charges of which he was 
7 convicted. I'm going to ask you to do that and have this 
8 brought before me. I may not be here. I may be in Summit 
9 County at the time but I want it in front of me. I want to 
10 keep possession of this particular case. I'm happy to come 
11 down or we can do it up there within 60 days and if you can't 
12 reach an agreement, I'm ultimately going to fashion one myself. 
13 I'm just hopeful that, you know, counsel you're both very 
14 reasonable so I'm certain you can reach some agreement. 
15 MS. BARLOW: Your Honor, could I suggest that the 
16 payment of restitution be through our office? I know that 
17 Adult Probation and Parole usually assesses a $30 per month and 
18 if we do it through our office we have a federal (inaudible) 
19 and we don't have to— 
20 THE COURT: Certainly, absolutely, 
21 MS. BARLOW: No offense to AP&P. 
22 THE COURT: No, I'm sure AP&P would frankly 
23 appreciate that. 
24 MR. ?: Yeah, that would be great. 


























at this time or what? 
THE COURT: No, I think what we'll do - if you can 
reach an agreement, a stipulated restitution plan, present it 
to me for review and signature. If you can't then I'm going to 
ask the State to file a motion within 60 days and schedule a 
restitution hearing. 
Mr. Simms, Mr. Wallace, questions? 
MR. SIMMS: Your Honor, the only other issue - well, 
in terms of just having Mr. Wallace advised about his appeal 
rights, I think that it might be appropriate to have an LDA 
appointed for the purposes of just informing him of his appeal 
rights. I don't know if that's appropriate. I know in earlier 
stages Mr. Wallace informed me of a desire to appeal. That was 
early on and I think maybe that needs to take place so somebody 
could advise him about that. 
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to appoint, let's 
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1 THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else in 
2 this particular matter? 
3 MS. BARLOW: Not on this matter. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Wallace, anything else? Good luck to 
5 you. 
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Addendum D 
§76-3-105 CRIMINAL CODE 
§ 7 6 - 3 - 1 0 5 . Infractions 
(1) Infractions are not classified. 
(2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is expressly designated 
and any offense defined outside this code which is not designated as a felony or 
misdemeanor and for which no penalty is specified is an infraction. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-105. 
Library References 
Criminal Law <S=»28. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 110k28. 
CJ.S. Criminal Law § 9. 
United States Code Annotated 
Petty offense defined, federal crimes and offenses, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 19. 
PART 2. SENTENCING 
§ 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 1 . Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences allowed— 
Civil penalties—Hearing 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) ' 'Conviction1' includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action 
arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal 
activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, 
broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical 
expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for 
extradition or transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, 
Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's crimi-
nal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
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(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for'contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow 
the criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime 
Victims Restitution Act. 
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall 
order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses 
if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime, 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmen-
tal transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure 
to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsec-
tion (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each 
defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually 
transported in a single trip. 
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(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 
30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of 
criminal activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court may, 
in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the defendant 
make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity for the 
extradition. 
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall 
order the defendant to pay court-ordered restitution to the county for the cost 
of incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after sentencing 
if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarcer-
ation in the county correctional facility; and 
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correc-
tional facility through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided 
under Section 64-13c-301 if the defendant is a state prisoner housed in a 
county correctional facility as a condition of probation under Subsection 
77-18-1(8). 
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are: 
(A) the daily core inmate incarceration costs and medical and trans-
portation costs established under Section 64-13c-302; and 
(B) the costs of transportation services and medical care that exceed 
the negotiated reimbursement rate established under Subsection 
64-13c-302(2). 
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include 
expenses incurred by the county correctional facility in providing reason-
able accommodation for an inmate qualifying as an individual with a 
disability as defined and covered by the federal Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including medical and mental 
health treatment for the inmate's disability. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for the court-
ordered restitution under this Subsection (6), the court shall consider the 
criteria provided under Subsections 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (iv). 
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity 
under Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 
76-1-304, the county shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defen-
dant paid for costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a). 
(7)(a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or present-
ing additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed with the 
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court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to the time set 
for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition 
of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, 
the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports received under 
Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the 
prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the 
sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons 
for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated 
by the Sentencing Commission. 
(8) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape 
of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a 
child, the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the 
charge is set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the 
defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be 
sentenced to the highest minimum term in state prison. This Subsection (8) 
takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-201; Laws 1979, c. 69, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 1; Laws 
1983, c. 85, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 3; Laws 1984, c. 18, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 156, § 1; 
Laws 1987, c. 107, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 81, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 142, § 1; Laws 1993, c. 
17, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 19; Laws 1995, c. I l l , § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, 
c. 117, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 301, § 1, eff. May \, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 
337, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, 1st Sp. Sess., c. 10, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 
1996, c. 40, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 98, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 
1996, c. 241, §§ 2, 3, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1998, c. 149, § 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 
1999, c. 270, § 15, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2001, c. 209, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 
2002, c. 35, § 4, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 280, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Laws 2002, c. 35, substantially rewrote this 
section that formerly provided: 
"(1) As used in this section: 
"(a) 'Conviction' includes a: 
"(0 judgment of guilt; and 
"(ii) plea of guilty. 
"(b) 'Criminal activities' means any offense of 
which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant ad-
mits responsibility to the sentencing court with 
or without an admission of committing the 
criminal conduct. 
"(c) 'Pecuniary damages' means all special 
damages, but not general damages, which a 
person could recover against the defendant in a 
civil action arising out of the facts or events 
constituting the defendant's criminal activities 
and includes the money equivalent of property 
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, 
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and losses including earnings and medical ex-
penses. 
"(d) 'Restitution' means full, partial, or nomi-
nal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, 
including the accrual of interest from the time 
of sentencing, insured damages, and payment 
for expenses to a governmental entity for extra-
dition or transportation and as further defined 
in Subsection (4)(c). 
"(e)(i) 'Victim' means any person who the 
court determines has suffered pecuniary dam-
ages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
"(ii) 'Victim' does not include any copartici-
pant in the defendant's criminal activities. 
"(2) Within the limits prescribed by this 
chapter, a court may sentence a person convict-
ed of an offense to any one of the following 
sentences or combination of them: 
"(a) to pay a fine; 
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PART 4. LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON SENTENCES 
§ 76 -3—401 . Concurrent or consecutive sentences—Limitations—Definition 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the 
order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to 
each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutive-
ly with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecu-
tively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the 
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if 
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and 
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, 
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6)(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of 
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as 
provided under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death 
penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct 
which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, 
and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his 
initial sentencing by any other court. 
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(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board 
of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if 
any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrent-
ly with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that 
provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of 
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
where the person is located. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-401; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 7; Laws 1989, c. 181, § 1; Laws 
1994, c. 13, § 21; Laws 1995, a. 139, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 283, § 1, eff. 
May 5, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 275, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2002, c. 129, § 1, eff. July 
1, 2002. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Laws 2002, c. 129, substantially rewrote this shall enter an amended order of commitment 
section that formerly provided: stating whether the sentences are to run consec-
"(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant utively or concurrently, 
has been adjudged guilty of more than one « ( 4 ) A c o m t s h a l l c o n s i d e r m e gravity and 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or
 c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e o f f e n s e s a n d m e ^ ^ ^ 
consecutive sentences for the offenses. Sen-
 c h a r a c t e r , and rehabilitative needs of the defen-
tences for state offenses shall run concurrently , . . , . . . , ,, . . 
unless the court states in the sentence that they d a n t m de t emin ing whether to impose consec-
shall run consecutively. u t l v e sentences. 
"(2) The court shall order that sentences for "(5) A court may impose consecutive sen-
state'offenses run consecutively if the later of- tences for offenses arising out of a single crimi-
fense is committed while the defendant is im- nal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401 . 
prisoned or on parole unless the court finds and "(6)(a) If a court imposes consecutive sen-
states on the record that consecutive sentencing tences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences 
would be inappropriate. imposed may not exceed 30 years imprison-
"(3) If an order of commitment does not
 m e n t , except as provided under Subsection 
clearly state whether the sentences shall run (6)(b). 
consecutively or concurrently, and the Board of
 (in. _. . . . . . 0 . . ,,\, \ 
Pardons and Parole has reason to believe that , *> tte R a t i o n under Subsection (6)(a) 
the later offense occurred while the person was d o ^ s n o t aPPty ± 
imprisoned or on parole for the earlier offense, "(0 an offense for which the defendant is 
the board shall request clarification from the sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a 
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§ 7 7 - 1 8 - 1 . Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation— 
Supervision—Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality— 
Terms and conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or exten-
sion—Hearings—Electronic monitoring 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of 
any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the 
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court 
may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections 
except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private 
organization; or 
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(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the 
sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investiga-
tion standards for all individuals referred to the department. These standards 
shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level 
of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to 
the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis 
for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to 
implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modi-
fications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other 
criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence 
for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence 
investigation report from the department or information from other sources 
about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the 
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement 
of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the depart-
ment regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
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(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to 
the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the 
prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. 
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have 
not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall 
be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an 
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report 
with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be 
resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on 
the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investiga-
tion report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be 
waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present con-
cerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the 
defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may 
require that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail 
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation by 
the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
.. (vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of 
electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including 
the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest 
in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; 
and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appro-
priate; and 
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(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation 
diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's 
own expense if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED certifi-
cate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as 
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under 
Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with 
Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance 
with Subsection (10). 
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or 
class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemean-
ors or infractions. 
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under 
Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account 
receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdic-
tion of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the 
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the 
registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and 
immediately transfer responsibility to collect the account to the Office of 
State Debt Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, 
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to 
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of 
court. 
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State 
Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all 
cases when termination of supervised probation will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and com-
plete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(ll)(a)(i) Any time served-by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke 
probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term 
unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
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toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the 
hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and condi-
tions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant 
by the court. 
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a 
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a 
finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts assert-
ed to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that 
authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable 
cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is 
justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be 
served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit 
and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked, 
modified, or extended. 
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the 
hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance, 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be 
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for 
him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of 
the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecut-
ing attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning 
by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of proba-
tion, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or 
that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
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(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah 
State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the 
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the 
court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the 
state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priori-
ty for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic eval-
uations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Gov-
ernment Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the. department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the 
subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that 
the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to state-
ments or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the crime 
including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime on the 
victim or the victim's household. 
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of proba-
tion under the supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 
76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to 
the department in accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of 
electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order of the 
court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropri-
ate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which 
require: 
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(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, 
it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Depart-
ment of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the 
defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of 
the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confine-
ment to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be 
indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this 
section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
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Historical and Statutory Notes 
Laws 2002, c. 35, modified the statutory refer- "(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by 
ences at the end of subsecs. (5)(c) and (8)(a)(ix), the victim as a result of the offense along with 
and rewrote subsec. (5)(b) that formerly provid- its seriousness and permanence; 
ed: "(iv) describe any change in the victim's per-
"(b) The presentence investigation report sonal welfare or familial relationships as a re-
shall include a victim impact statement describ- suit of the offense; 
ing the effect of the crime on the victim and the "(v) identify any request for psychological 
victim's family. The victim impact statement services initiated by the victim or the victim's 
shall: family as a result of the offense; and 
"(i) identify all victims of the offense; "(vi) contain any other information related to 
"(ii) include a specific statement of the rec- the impact of the offense upon the victim or the 
ommended amount of complete restitution as victim's family and any information required by 
defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompa- Section 77-38a-203 that is relevant to the trial 
nied by a recommendation from the department court's sentencing determination." 
regarding the payment of court-ordered restitu- Laws 2002, 5th Sp. Sess. c. 8, modified the 
tion as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4) by the division name in the introduction to subsec. (13) 
defendant; and the statute references in subsec. (13)(c). 
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When a defendant who has given bail appears for trial, the court may, at 
any time after his appearance for trial, order him to be committed to the 




77-18-1. Suspension of sentence—Probation—Period—Conditions—Revoca-
tion. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or 
offense, if it appears compatible with the public interest, the court may sus-
pend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on pro-
bation for such period of time as it determines. The legal custody of all pro-
bationers is vested in the court having jurisdiction of the offender and the 
chief agent of the adult probation and parole section of the state division of 
corrections. In cases that do not involve an indeterminate sentence, the 
period of probation may exceed the length of time of the maximum sentence 
that could be imposed. 
(2) Prior to imposing any sentence for an offense for which probation 
may be granted, the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, con-
tinue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time 
for the purpose of obtaining a pre-sentence report on the defendant. The 
contents of the report shall be confidential. The court may disclose all or 
parts of the report to the defendant or his counsel as the interest of justice 
requires. At the time of sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney may wish to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. Such testimony or information shall be 
presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(3) After hearing, the court may increase or decrease the probation 
period and may revoke or modify any condition of probation. While on pro-
bation, and as a condition thereof, the defendant may be required to pay, in 
one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on proba-
tion and may be required to make restitution or reparation to the aggrieved 
party or parties for pecuniary damages as provided in section 76-3-201 caused 
by the offense to which the defendant had pleaded guilty, no contest or for 
which a conviction was had. The defendant may be required to pay amounts 
required under provisions of section 77-32a-l through 77-32a-14. He may 
also be required to provide for the support of others for whose support he is 
legally liable, to participate in rehabilitation programs as may be available, 
and to serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year. 
(4)(a) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and 
a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted 
to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court which autho-
rized probation shall determine whether the affidavit establishes probable 
cause to believe that revocation or modification of probation may be justified. 
If the court determines that there is probable cause, it shall cause to be 
served on the defendant a copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause 
why his probation should not be revoked or modified. 
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(2) In all cases, proof of the sale, furnishing, bartering or procuring of 
any lottery ticket, share or interest therein, or of any instrument purporting 
to be a ticket, or part or share of any ticket shall be evidence that the share 
or interest was signed and issued according to its purport. 
77-17-7. Conviction on testimony of accomplice—Instruction to jury. 
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an 
accomplice. 
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury may be given 
to the effect that such uncorroborated testimony should be viewed with cau-
tion, and such an instruction shall be given if the trial judge finds the testi-
mony of the accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or improbable. 
77-17-8. Mistake in charging offense—Procedure. 
If at any time before verdict or judgment a mistake has been made in 
charging the proper offense, and it appears that there is probable cause to 
believe that the defendant is chargeable with another offense, the court may 
commit him or require him to give bail for his appearance to answer to the 
proper charge when filed, and may also require witnesses to give bail for their 
appearance. 
77-17-9. Separation or sequestration of jurors—Oath of officer having 
custody. 
(1) The court, at any time before the submission of the case to the jury, 
may permit the jury to separate or order that it be sequestered in charge of a 
proper officer. 
(2) If the jury is sequestered the officer shall be sworn to keep the jurors 
together until the next meeting of the court, to prevent any person from 
speaking or communicating with them, and not to do so himself on any sub-
ject connected with the trial, and to return the jury to the court pursuant to 
its order. 
77-17-10. Court to determine law; the jury, the facts. 
(1) In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court, 
questions of fact by the jury. 
(2) The jury may find a general verdict which includes questions of law as 
well as fact but they are bound to follow the law as stated by the court. 
77-17-11. Jury to retire for deliberation—Oath of officer having custody. 
After hearing the court's instructions and arguments of counsel, the jury 
shall retire for deliberation. An officer shall be sworn to keep them together 
in some private and convenient place and not permit any person to speak to 
or communicate with them or to do so himself except upon the order of the 
court, or to ask them whether they have agreed on a verdict. He shall return 
them to court when they have agreed and the court has so ordered, or when 
otherwise ordered by the court. 
77-17-12. Defendant on bail appearing for trial may be committed. 
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CH. 20 CRIMINAL LAW 
CHAPTER 20 
S. B. No. 91 (Passed January 28, 1984. In effect March 29, 1984.) 
MISDEMEANORS- -PROBATION REDUCTIONS 
By Senators Stratford, Cornaby 
AN ACT RELATING TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; OMITTING PROBA-
TION FOR CLASS C MISDEMEANORS; SPECIFYING PROBATION 
PROCEDURES IN GENERAL; AND PLACING RESTITUTION OB-
LIGATIONS OUTSTANDING AT THE END OF PROBATION UNDER 
THE COURTS* CIVIL JURISDICTION FOR COLLECTION. 
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 77-18-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 85, LAWS OF UTAH 1983. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 77-18-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by 
Chapter 85, Laws of Utah 1983, is amended to read: 
77-18-1 . Suspension of sentence--Probation--Period-- Supervision -
- Presentence investigation - - Conditions - - Restitution - - Revocation. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or 
offense, except in the case of class C misdemeanors, for which probation 
may not be imposed, and if it appears compatible with the public interest, 
the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place 
the defendant on probation for [sueh] a period of time [as] it 
[ determines ] may determine, unless otherwise provided by law. The legal 
custody of all probationers is vested in the court having jurisdiction of the 
offender and the chief agent of the adult probation and parole section of 
the [state division of corrections] Division of Corrections. [In cases that 
do not involve an indeterminate sentence, the period of probation may 
exceed the length of time of the maximum sentence that could be im-
posed.] 
(2) (a) The Division of Corrections shall establish presentence inves-
tigation and supervision standards for all individuals under its jurisdiction. 
These standards shall be based on the type of offense and other criteria, 
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including the demand for services and the available agency resources, which 
the Division of Corrections deems appropriate to determine what level of 
services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted 
to the State Judicial Council and Board of Pardons for review and comment 
prior to adoption by the Division of Corrections. 
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Division of Correc-
tions is not required to supervise the probation or parole of any person 
convicted of a class B or C misdemeanor but may, at the discretion of the 
Division of Corrections, and based upon adopted standards, accept a person 
for supervision who is convicted of a class B misdemeanor. 
[{3)] (4) Prior to imposition of any sentence for an offense for which 
probation may be granted, the court may, with the concurrence of the 
defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reason-
able period of time for the purpose of obtaining a pre-sentence report on 
the defendant The report shall be prepared by the [department of adult 
probation and parole] Department of Adult Probation and Parole. The 
report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied 
by a recommendation from adult probation and parole regarding the 
payment of restitution by the defendant. The contents of the report shall be 
confidential. The court may disclose all or parts of the report to the 
defendant or his counsel as the interest of justice requires. At the time of 
sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or information the defendant 
or the prosecuting attorney may wish to present concerning the appropriate 
sentence. [Such] This testimony or information shall be presented in open 
court on record and in the presence of the defendant 
[43)] (5) After a plea or verdict of guilty, or after a verdict against 
the defendant on a plea of a former conviction or acquittal or once in 
jeopardy, if the judgment is not arrested or a new trial granted, the court 
must appoint a time for pronouncing judgment in accordance with Rule 22, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Whenever possible, in all offenses 
involving damage to persons or property, the pre-sentence report of the 
defendant shall be made available to the court prior to the pronouncement 
of judgment 
[(4)] (6) After a hearing, the court may increase or decrease the 
probation period, unless otherwise provided by law, and may revoke or 
modify any condition of probation. While on probation, and as a condition 
thereof, the defendant may be required to: 
(a) [Pay] gay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of 
being placed on probation; 
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(b) [Pay] pa^ amounts required under provisions of Section 77-32a-l 
through 77-32a-14; 
(c) [Provide] provide for the support of others for whose support he 
is legally liable; 
(d) [Participate] participate in available rehabilitation programs; 
(e) [Serve] serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one 
year; or 
(f) [Serve] serve a term of home confinement The court may impose 
all or part of the costs of supervision as a condition of home confinement 
(7) Restitution shall be imposed unless upon a hearing in court a 
finding is made that restitution is inappropriate under Subsection 76-3-201 
(3) (b) or the defendant objects to its imposition under Subsection 76-3-201 
(3) (c). 
[{5}] (8) While on probation and as a condition thereof, the defendant 
shall be required to make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims 
as defined in Subsection 76-3-201 (4) for pecuniary damages as provided in 
Section 76-3-201 caused by the offense to which the defendant has pleaded 
guilty, no contest, or for which a conviction was had or by any other 
criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court, unless 
the court in applying the criteria stated in Subsection 76-3-201 (3) finds 
that restitution is inappropriate. If the court determines that restitution is 
inappropriate, the court shall state for the court record the reasons for the 
decision. 
[(6)] (9) The prosecutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to 
the clerk of the court The clerk shall place the order on the civil docket 
and shall provide notice of the order to the parties. The order shall be 
treated as a legal judgment under which the victim may seek civil remedy. 
(10) (a) Upon completion without violation of 18 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor 
cases, the offender shall be terminated from sentence and the supervision 
of the Division of Corrections, unless the person is earlier terminated by 
the court 
(b) The Division of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court in 
writing of all cases where termination of supervision occurs by law. The 
notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report 
of details on outstanding fines and restitution orders. 
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(11) (a) All time served on probation by any person without violation 
applies to service of the total term of probation but does not preclude the 
requirement of serving 18 months without violation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor cases. Any time 
spent by a person outside of confinement after commission of a probation 
violation does not constitute service of the total term unless the person is 
exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. Any time spent in 
confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation of proba-
tion does not constitute service of the term of probation except in the case 
of exoneration at the hearing, in which case the time spent shall be included 
in computing the total probation term. 
(b) Whenever any probationer, without authority from the Division of 
Corrections, absents himself from the state, or avoids or evades probation 
supervision, the period of absence, avoidance, or evasion tolls the probation 
period. 
(c) Nothing in this section precludes the court from discharging a 
probationer at any time, at the discretion of the court 
[(?}] (12) (a) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in 
court and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court 
which authorized probation shall determine whether the affidavit establishes 
probable cause to believe that revocation or modification of probation may 
be justified. If the court determines that there is probable cause, it shall 
cause to be served on the defendant a copy of the affidavit and an order to 
show cause why his probation should not be revoked or modified. 
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing, which shall be within seven days of the service upon the defendant 
unless he shows good cause for a continuance, and shall inform the 
defendant of a right to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to 
have counsel appointed for him if he is indigent The order shall also 
inform the defendant of a right to present evidence as provided in the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations, which need 
not be evidence admissible in a trial. The persons who have given adverse 
information on which the allegations are based shall be presented as 
witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the court for good 
cause otherwise orders. The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak 
in his own behalf, and present evidence. 
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(e) After hearing, the court shall make findings of fact. Upon 
determining that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the 
court may order the probation revoked, modified, or continued. If proba-
tion is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously 
imposed shall be executed. 
[(8) Restitution shall be imposed unless upon a hearing in court a 
finding is made that restitution is inappropriate pursuant to Subsection 
76 3-201 (3) (b) or the defendant objects to its imposition pursuant to 
Subsection 76 3 201 (3) (c). ] 
(13) In cases where an 18-month probation term in felony and class A 
misdemeanor cases or a six-month term in class B misdemeanor cases has 
been completed without violation, but fine or restitution orders are still 
outstanding, supervision by the Division of Corrections shall be terminated 
pursuant to this section. The court may retain civil jurisdiction for the 
purposes of collecting the fines or restitution. In these cases, the court may 
order the Department of Social Services to enforce the collection, and the 
Office of Recovery Services may withhold the cost of collection from any 
recovered fine or restitution. 
[(9)] (14) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt 
for "willful and malicious injury" for purposes of exceptions listed to 
discharge in bankruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 523, U.S.C.A. 
Approved February 16, 1984. 
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1953, is enacted to read: 
55-15b-13.5. Costs for services to abused spouses 
assessed against abusing spouse. 
Costs for services provided by the division to 
abused spouses under the authority of Section 55-
15b-7 shall be assessed against the abusing spouse, 
according to rules established by the department. 
Section 2. Section Amended. 
Section 77-36-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as enacted by Chapter 114, Laws of Utah 1983, is 
amended to read: 
77-36-5. Sentencing - Restricting contact with 
victim - Counseling - Cost assessed against 
defendant. 
(1) When a defendant is found guilty of a crime 
and a condition of the sentence restricts the defen-
dant's contact with the victim, the condition shall 
be included in a written order and the prosecutor 
shall provide a certified copy of that order to the 
victim. 
(2) In determining its sentence, the court, in 
addition to penalties otherwise provided for by law, 
may require the defendant to participate in treat-
ment or therapy under the direction of an organiz-
ation or individual experienced in domestic violence 
counseling. The court may also require the defen-
dant to pay all or part of the cost of counseling 
incurred by the victim, as well as the costs for def-
endant's own counseling. The court shall assess 
against the defendant, as restitution, any costs for 
services or treatment provided to the abused spouse 
by the Division of Family Services under Section 55-
15b-7. The court shall order those costs to be paid 
directly to the division. 
CHAPTER 114 
H. B. No. 167 
Passed February 25, 1987 
Approved March 16, 1987 
Effective April 27, 1987 
MISDEMEANOR PROBATION -
AMENDMENTS 
By G. LaMont Richards 
AN ACT RELATING TO CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE; AMENDING PROVISIONS RELATED 
TO PROBATION AND RESTITUTION 
WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF CORREC-
TIONS. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
77-18-1, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS 
Utah 1987 
1 212 AND 229, LAWS OF UTAH 1985 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 77-18-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as last amended by Chapters 212 and 229, Laws of 
Utah 1985, is amended to read: 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence - Probation -
Supervision - Presentence investigation * 
Confidential - Terms - Restitution - Extension 
or revocation - Hearings. 
(1) (a) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conv-
iction of any crime or offense, [except in the case 
of class C misdemeanors,—for which supervised 
probation by the Department of Corrections may 
not be imposed, and if it appears compatible with 
the public interest,] the court may suspend the imp-
osition or execution of sentence and place the defe-
ndant on probation [for a period of time it may 
determine,—unless—otherwise—provided—by—law]. 
Supervised probation by the department may not be 
imposed by the court in cases of class C misdemea-
nors or infractions. The [legal custody] jurisdiction 
of all probationers referred to the Department of 
Corrections is vested in the court having jurisdiction 
[and]; custody is with the Department of Correct-
ions. 
(b) The legal custody of all [unsupervised] prob-
ationers not referred to the department is vested [in] 
as ordered by the court having jurisdiction of the 
[offender] defendant. The court has continuing 
jurisdiction over all probationers. . . 
(2) (a) The Department of Corrections shall esta-
blish supervision and presentence investigation [and 
supervision] standards for all individuals [under its 
jurisdiction] referred to the department. These stan-
dards shall be based on the type of offense2 [and 
other criteria, including] the demand for services1 
[and] the [available] availability of agency resou-
rces, [which] and other criteria established by the 
Department of Corrections [deems appropriate] to 
determine what level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation stan-
dards shall be submitted to the [State] Judicial 
Council and Board of Pardons for review and 
comment prior to adoption by the Department of 
Corrections. 
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the 
Department of Corrections is not required to supe-
rvise the probation [or parole] of [any person] 
persons convicted of [a] class B or C [misdemeanor 
but may, at the discretion of the Department of 
Corrections, and based upon adopted standards, 
accept a person for supervision who is convicted of 
a class B misdemeanor] misdemeanors or infractions, 
or to conduct presentence investigation reports on 
class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the 
department may supervise the probation of class B 
misdemeanants in accordance with department sta-
ndards. 
(4) Prior to the imposition of any sentence [fef 
an offense for which probation may be granted], the 
court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, 
continue the date for the imposition of sentence for 
a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obt-
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aining a presentence investigation report from the 
Department of Corrections or information from 
other sources [enJ about the defendant. [The report 
shall be prepared by the adult probation and parole 
section of the Department of Corrections.] The 
presentence investigation report shall include a spe-
cific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied 
by a recommendation from [Adult Probation and 
Parole] the Department of Corrections regarding the 
payment of restitution by the defendant. The cont-
ents of the report [shall be] are confidential and not 
available except for purposes of sentencing as pro-
vided by rule of the Judicial Council and for use by 
the Department of Corrections. [The court may 
disclose all or parts of the report to the defendant 
or his counsel as the interest of justice requires.] At 
the time of sentence, the court shall hear any testi-
mony or information the defendant or the prosecu-
ting attorney [may wish] desires to present concer-
ning the appropriate sentence. This testimony or 
information shall be presented in open court on 
record and in the presence of the defendant. 
[(5) After a plea or verdict of guilty, or after a 
verdict against the defendant on a plea of a former 
conviction or acquittal or once in jeopardy, if the 
judgment is not arrested or a new trial granted, the 
court shall appoint a time for pronouncing judg-
ment in accordance with Rule 22, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. When possible, in all offenses 
involving damage to persons or property, the pres-
entence report of the defendant shall be made ava-
ilable to the court prior to the pronouncement of 
judgment.] 
[(6) After a hearing, the court may increase or 
decrease the probation period,—unless—otherwise 
provided by law, and may revoke or modify any 
condition of probation.] 
(5) While on probation, and as a condition of 
probation, the defendant may be required to 
perform any or all of the following: 
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed 
at the time of being placed on probation; 
(b) pay amounts required under [provisions of 
Section 77 32a-1—through 77 32a 14] Chapter 
32a, Title 77, Defense Costs; 
(c) provide for the support of others for whose 
support he is legally liable; 
(d) participate in available [rehabilitation] 
treatment programs; 
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to 
exceed one year; [OF] 
(f) serve a term of home confinement [. The court 
may impose all or part of the costs of supervision as 
a condition of home confinement.fc 
(g) participate in community service restitution 
programs; 
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, 
and treatment services; and 
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or 
victims in accordance with Subsections 76-3-201 
(3) and (4). 
[(7) Restitution shall be imposed unless upon a 
hearing in court a finding is made that restitution is 
inappropriate under Subsection 76 3 201—(3) (b) 
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or the defendant objects to its imposition under 
Subsection 76 3 201 (3) (c).] 
[(8) While on probation and as a condition of 
probation, the defendant shall be required to make 
restitution or reparation to the victim or victims as 
defined in Subsection 76 3-201 (4) for pecuniary 
damages as provided in Section 76-3 201 caused 
by the offense to which the defendant has pleaded 
guilty, no contest, or for which a conviction was 
had or by any other criminal conduct admitted by 
the defendant to the sentencing court, unless the 
court in applying the criteria stated in Subsection 76 • 
3 201 (3) finds that restitution is inappropriate. If 
the court determines that restitution is inappropr 
iate, the court shall state for the court record the 
reasons for the decision.] 
[{9)] (6) The Department of Corrections is respo-
nsible for the collection of fines and restitution 
during the probation period in cases where the court 
orders supervised probation by the department. The 
prosecutor shall provide notice of the restitution 
order to the clerk of the court. The clerk shall place 
the order on the civil docket and shall provide 
notice of the order to the parties. The order [shall 
be treated as] is considered a legal judgment under 
which the victim may seek civil remedy. 
K±0)] (7} (a) Upon completion without violation 
of 18 months' probation in felony or class A mis-
demeanor cases, or six months in class B misdeme-
anor cases, the [offender] probation period shall be 
terminated [from sentence], unless [the person is] 
earlier terminated by the court. 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify 
the sentencing court and prosecuting attorney in 
writing [30] 45 days in advance in all cases where 
termination of supervision will occur by law. The 
notification shall include a probation progress report 
and complete report of details on outstanding fines 
and restitution orders. 
(c) At any time prior to the termination of prob-
ation [the court may, after a hearing with proper 
notice, upon its own motion or the motion of the 
prosecutor, extend probation for good cause shown, 
for one additional term of 18 months in felony or 
class A misdemeanor cases or six months in class B 
misdemeanor cases. The reasons for the extension of 
the probation period shall be made a part of the 
court record], upon a minimum of five days' notice 
and a hearing or upon a waiver of the notice and 
hearing by the probationer, the court may extend 
probation for an additional term of 18 months in 
felony or class A misdemeanors or six months in 
class B misdemeanors if fines or restitution or both 
are owing. 
[(d) On a plea of guilty or no contest or convic 
tion of any crime or offense by a defendant prese-
ntly serving a term of probation, the court may 
order that the term of probation for the original 
crime or offense commence again for the full term.] 
[(44)] (8) (a) All time served without violation 
while on probation [by any person without viola-
tien] applies to service of the total term of probation 
but does not [preclude] eliminate the requirement of 
serving 18 consecutive months without violation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or six 
consecutive months without violation in class B 
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misdemeanor cases. Any time [spent] served by a 
[person] probationer outside of confinement after 
[commission of] having been charged with a prob-
ation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke 
probation does not constitute service of time toward 
the total probation term unless the [person] 
probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the 
probation. Any time [spent] served in confinement 
awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation 
of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term [of probation 
except—in] unless the [ease—of—exoneration] 
probationer is exonerated at the hearing[, in which 
case the time spent shall be included in computing 
the total probation term]. 
(b) [Whenever] When any probationer, without 
authority from the court or the Department of 
Corrections, absents himself from the state, or 
avoids or evades probation supervision, the period 
of absence, avoidance, or evasion tolls the probation 
period. 
(c) Nothing in this section precludes the court 
from discharging a probationer at any time, at the 
discretion of the court. 
[(42)] (9) (a) [Probation] Except as provided in 
Subsection (7) (c) of this chapter, probation may not 
be [revoked] modified or extended except upon 
waiver of a hearing by the probationer or upon a 
hearing [in court] and a finding in court that the 
probationer has violated the conditions of probation 
[have been violated]. Probation may not be revoked 
except upon a hearing in court and a finding that 
the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with 
particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of 
the conditions of probation, the court which auth-
orized probation shall determine whether the affid-
avit establishes probable cause to believe that revo-
cation, [er] modification, or extension of probation 
[may be] is justified. If the court determines that 
there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served 
on the defendant a copy of the affidavit and an 
order to show cause why his probation should not 
be revoked2 [OF] modified, or extended. 
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time 
and place for the hearing, [which shall be within 
seven days of the service upon the defendant unless 
he shows] and shall be served upon the defendant at 
least five days prior to the hearing. The defendant 
shall show good cause for a continuance [-rand]. The 
order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a 
right to be represented by counsel at the hearing and 
to have counsel appointed for him if he is indigent. 
The order shall also inform the defendant of a right 
to present evidence [as provided in the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure]. 
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or 
deny the allegations of the affidavit. If the defen-
dant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the 
allegations!, which need not be evidence admissible 
in a trial]. The persons who have given adverse inf-
ormation on which the allegations are based shall be 
presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the 
defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise 
orders. The defendant may call witnesses, appear 
and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence. 
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(e) After hearing, the court shall make findings of 
fact. Upon [determining] a finding that the defen-
dant violated the conditions of probation, the court 
may order the probation revoked, modified, [er] 
continued, or that the entire probation term com-
mence anew. If probation is revoked, the defendant 
shall be sentenced or the sentence previously 
imposed shall be executed. 
[(13) In cases where an—18 month—probation 
term in felony and class A misdemeanor cases or a 
six-month term in class B misdemeanor cases has 
been completed without violation, but fine or resti-
tution orders are still outstanding, supervision by 
the Department of Corrections shall be terminated 
pursuant to this section. In class B misdemeanors 
where probation supervision is not provided, the 
court may order the Department of Corrections to 
monitor the payment of any fine or restitution 
ordered and give the court notice of the completion 
of payment or the failure of the defendant to make 
payment as ordered. The court may retain jurisdic-
tion for the purposes of collecting the fines or rest-
itution. In these cases, the court may order the 
Department of Social Services to enforce the colle-
ction, and the Office of Recovery Services may 
withhold the cost of collection from any recovered 
fine or restitution.] 
[(W)] (10) Restitution imposed under this- chapter 
is considered a debt for "willful and malicious 
injury" for purposes of exceptions listed to disch-
arge in bankruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 
523, U.S.C.A. 1985. 
CHAPTER 115 
H. B. No. 170 
Passed February 24, 1987 
Approved March 16, 1987 
Effective April 27, 1987 
JUVENILE COURT - DIRECTOR OF 
COURT SERVICES 
By Afton B. Bradshaw 
AN ACT RELATING TO JUVENILE COURTS; 
EXEMPTING THE POSITION OF DISTRICT 
DIRECTOR OF COURT SERVICES FROM 
THE STATE MERIT SYSTEM. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
78-3A-12, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
47, LAWS OF UTAH 1986 
78-3A-13, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAP-
TERS 83 AND 156, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
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CHAPTER 226 
H . B . N o . 3 1 4 
Passed February 22, 1989 
Approved March 14,1989 
Effective April 24, 1989 
PROBATION AMENDMENTS 
By R. Lee Ellertson 
AN ACT RELATING TO CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE; AMENDING PROVISIONS RE-
GARDING PROBATION, INCLUDING THE 
LENGTH OF PROBATION AND SUPERVI-
SION. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
77-18-1 , AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 114, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1987 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Sect ion 1. Sect ion Amended. 
Section 77-18-1 , Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 114, Laws of Utah 1987, is 
amended to read: 
77-18-1. Suspens ion of s en tence — Probat ion 
— Supervis ion — Presentence invest iga-
t ion — Standards — Confidential — Terms 
— Termination — Rest i tut ion — Revoca-
t ion — Hearings . 
(1) (a) On a plea of guilty or no contest or convic-
tion of any crime or offense, the court may suspend 
the imposition or execution of sentence and place 
the defendant on probation. [Supervised] The court 
may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation [fey] under the supervision of the 
[department may not be imposed by the court] De-
partment of Corrections except in cases of class C 
misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local govern-
ment or with a private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court. [The jurisdiction of all proba-
tioners referred to the Department of Corrections is 
vested in the court having jurisdiction; custody is 
with the Department of Corrections.] 
(b) The legal custody of all probationers [not re-
ferred to] under the supervision of the department 
is with the Department of Corrections. The legal 
custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the 
court [having jurisdiction of the defendant]. The 
court has continuing jurisdiction over all probation-
(2) (a) The Department of Corrections shall estab-
lish supervision and presentence investigation 
standards for all individuals referred to the depart-
ment. These standards shall be based on the type of 
offense, the demand for services, the availability of 
agency resources, the public safety, and other crite-
ria established by the Department of Corrections to 
determine what level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation stan-
dards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and 
Board of Pardons on an annual basis for review and 
comment prior to adoption by the Department of 
Corrections. 
(c) The Judicial Council and department shall es-
tablish procedures to implement the supervision 
and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall 
annually consider modifications to the standards 
based upon criteria in Subsection (2) (a) and other 
criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall 
annually prepare an impact report and submit it to 
the appropriate legislative appropriations commit-
tee. 
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the 
Department of Corrections is not required to super-
vise the probation of persons convicted of class B or 
C misdemeanors or infractions, or to conduct pres-
entence investigation reports on class C misde-
meanors or infractions. However, the department 
may supervise the probation of class B mis-
demeanants in accordance with department stan-
dards. 
(4) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the 
court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, 
continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a 
reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtain-
ing a presentence investigation report from the De-
partment of Corrections or information from other 
sources about the defendant. The presentence in-
vestigation report shall include a specific s tatement 
of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recom-
mendation from the Department of Corrections re-
garding the payment of restitution by the defen-
dant. The contents of the report are confidential 
and not available except for purposes of sentencing 
as provided by rule of the Judicial Council and for 
use by the Department of Corrections. 
(b) At the time of sentence, the court shall hear 
any testimony or information the defendant or the 
prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning 
the appropriate sentence. This testimony or infor-
mation shall be presented in open court on record 
and in the presence of the defendant. 
(5) While on probation, and as a condition of pro-
bation, the defendant may be required to perform 
any or all of the following: 
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed a t 
the time of being placed on probation; 
(b) pay amounts required under Chapter 32a, 
Title 77, Defense Costs; 
(c) provide for the support of others for whose sup-
port he is legally liable; 
(d) participate in available t reatment programs; 
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to 
exceed one year; 
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(f) serve a term of home confinement; 
(g) participate in community service restitution 
programs; 
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, 
and treatment services; [and] 
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or 
victims in accordance with Subsections 76-3-201 
(3) and (4)[J; and 
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the 
court considers appropriate, 
(6) The Department of Corrections is responsible, 
upon order of the court, for the collection of fines and 
restitution during the probation period in cases 
[where] for which the court orders supervised pro-
bation by the department. The prosecutor shall pro-
vide notice of the restitution order to the clerk of the 
court. The clerk shall place the order on the civil 
docket and shall provide notice of the order to the 
parties. The order is considered a legal judgment 
[under which the victim may sock civil remedy] en-
forceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(7) (a) [Upon] Probation may be terminated at any 
time at the discretion of the court or upon comple-
tion without violation of [18 months'] 36 months 
probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 
[six] 12 months in cases of class B [misdemeanor 
cases, the probation period shall be tcrminatccVun-
lo3s earlier terminated by the court] or C misde-
meanors or infractions. If the defendant, upon expi-
ration or termination of the probation period, has 
outstanding fines or restitution owing, the court 
may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the 
defendant on bench probation or place the defen-
dant on bench probation for the limited purpose of 
enforcing the payment of fines and restitution. 
Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its 
own motion, the court may require the defendant to 
show cause why his failure to pay should not be 
treated as contempt of court or why the suspended 
jail or prison term should not be imposed. 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the 
sentencing court and prosecuting attorney in writ-
ing [45 days] in advance in all cases [where] when 
termination of [supervision] supervised probation 
will occur by law. The notification shall include a 
probation progress report and complete report of de-
tails on outstanding fines and restitution orders. 
[(c) At any time prior to the termination of proba-
tion, upon a minimum of five days' notice and a hear-
ing or upon a waiver of the notice and hearing by the 
probationer, the court may extend probation for an 
additional term of 18 months in felony or class A 
misdemeanors or six months in class B misdemean-
ors if fines or restitution or both arc owing.] 
(8) (a) [All time served without violation while on 
probation applies to service of the total term of pro-
bation but docs not eliminate the requirement of 
serving 18 consecutive months without violation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or six consecu-
tive months without violation in clas3 B misde-
meanor ca3ca.] Any time served by a probationer 
outside of confinement after having been charged 
with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to 
revoke probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the proba-
tioner is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the pro-
bation. Any time served in confinement awaiting a 
hearing or decision concerning revocation of proba-
tion does not constitute service of time toward the 
total probation term unless the probationer is exon-
erated at the hearing. 
(b) [When any probationer, without authority 
from the court or the Department of Corrections, ab-
sents himself from the state, or avoids or evades pro-
bation supervision, the period of absence, avoid-
anco, or evasion tolls the probation period.] The run-
ning of the probation period is tolled upon the filing 
of a violation report with the court alleging a viola-
tion of the terms and conditions of probation or upon 
the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by 
the court. 
[(c) Nothing in this section precludes the court 
from discharging a probationer at any time, at the 
discretion of the court.] 
(9) (a) [Except a3 provided in Subsection (7) (c) of 
this chapter, probation] Probation may not be modi-
fied or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by 
the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the condi-
tions of probation. Probation may not be revoked ex-
cept upon a hearing in court and a finding that the 
conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with 
particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of 
the conditions of probation, the court [which] that 
authorized probation shall determine [whether] if 
the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe 
that revocation, modification, or extension of proba-
tion is justified. If the court determines [that] there 
is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the 
defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his proba-
tion should not be revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time 
and place for the hearing, and shall be served upon 
the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing. 
The defendant shall show good cause for a continu-
ance. The order to show cause shall inform the de-
fendant of a right to be represented by counsel at the 
hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if he 
is indigent. The order shall also inform the defen-
dant of a right to present evidence. 
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or 
d e ^ the allegations of the affidavit. If the defen-
dant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the 
allegations. The persons who have given adverse in-
formation on which the allegations are based shall 
be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by 
the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. The defendant may call witnesses, ap-
pear and speak in his own behalf, and present evi-
dence. 
(e) After the hearing^] the court shall make find-
ings of fact. Upon a finding that the defendant vio-
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lated the conditions of probation, the court may or-
der the probation revoked, modified, continued, or 
that the entire probation term commence anew. If 
probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sen-
tenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be 
executed. 
(10) Restitution imposed under this chapter is 
considered a debt for "willful and malicious injury" 
for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in 
bankruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 523, 
U.S.C.A. 1985. 
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